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DISCRIMINATION & DEFERENCE: MAKING A CASE FOR THE
EEOC'S EXPERTISE WITH ENGLISH-ONLY RULES
I. INTRODUCTION
In famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,' the Su-
preme Court asserted its unfettered devotion to preventing "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities."2 Somehow, a mere sixty years
later, courts seem to have forgotten their integral role as protector of mi-
nority rights. 3 When faced with questions regarding English-only rules in
the workplace, the majority of circuit courts have upheld English-only
rules. 4 Instead of conducting a "more searching judicial inquiry," courts
frequently dismiss cases by finding that plaintiff employees failed to make
out a prima facie case of national origin discrimination. 5 The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, however, direct
courts to closely scrutinize English-only rules because they are inherently
discriminatory. 6
Inasmuch as the United States is a nation of immigrants, the United
States does not have an official declared language. 7 Nevertheless, thirty
1. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
2. See id. at 152 n.4 (calling for stricter review of cases involving "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities").
3. See generally Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (de-
ciding against plaintiff employee); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406,
1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding radio station did not discriminate against bilingual
employee); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1980) (determining that
plaintiff employee was not entitled to exercise his language preference); Long v.
First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 942 (E.D. Va. 1995) (dismissing plain-
tiff employee's case); Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, No. 89-1679-C[V-T-17, 1991 WL
11009376, at *3 (M.D. Fla.June 3, 1991), affd, 985 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1993) (af-
firming decision against employee without written opinion), cert. denied, 508 U.S.
910 (1993).
4. SeeJurado, 813 F.2d at 1410 (explaining that Arbitron market ratings were
valid business reasons for implementing English-only rule); Gloor, 618 F.2d at 267-
68 (implying that Gloor advanced valid business reasons that defeated employee's
claim of discrimination); Long, 894 F. Supp. at 942 (detailing customer and em-
ployee complaints to conclude that workplace hostility necessitated English-only
rule); Gonzalez, 1991 WL 11009376, at *2-3 (finding poor workplace morale justi-
fied implementation of English-only rule).
5. See Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (calling on courts to employ more search-
ing judicial inquiry when considering cases involving discrete and insular
minorities).
6. See Speak-English-only Rules, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2008) ("[T]he Commis-
sion will presume that such a rule violates [T]itle VII and will closely scrutinize
it.").
7. See English Language Unity Act of 2007, H.R.J. Res. 997, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl10-997 (at-
tempting to declare English official language of United States). On January 18,
2007, Colorado Congressman Tom Tancredo introduced a joint resolution pro-
(595)
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states have amended their constitution or adopted legislation to declare
English their official language.8 Likewise, businesses have begun imple-
menting English-only rules to declare English the official language of their
workplace. 9 Even though some of these rules can be supported by legiti-
posing to make English the official language of the United States. See id. (intro-
ducing bill to make English official language of United States). To date, this bill
has not been approved. See U.S. English, Inc., Legislative History: Legislation
(2005), http://www.usenglish.org/inc/legislation/history/legislation.asp (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2008) (providing extensive legislative history of official English legis-
lation). Since 1981, House representatives have futilely proposed over fifty similar
amendments without success. See id. (listing numerous attempts to make English
official language of United States). See generally William Lynch, A Nation Established
by Immigrants Sanctions Employers for Requiring English to be Spoken at Work: English-
Only Work Rules and National Origin Discrimination, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REX'.
65, 67 (2006) (finding it "ironic that a nation established by immigrants would
restrict ... [immigrants] from speaking their primary tongue").
8. See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 36.01 (making English official language of state);
COLO. CONsT. art. II, §30a (same); FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9 (same); HAw. CONST. art.
XV, § 4 (same); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27 (same); ALAsKA STAT. ANN. § 44.12.300
(1998) (same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-4-117 (West 1987) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-
3-100 (West 1996) (same); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-121 (2007) (same); 5 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 460/20 (West 1991) (same); IND. CODE § 1-2-10-1 (1984) (same); IowA
CODE ANN. § 1.18 (West 2002) (same); Miss. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31 (West 1987)
(same); Mo. ANN. STAT. §1.028 (West 1998) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-510
(1995) (same); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §3-C:1 (1995) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 145-12 (West 1987) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13 (1987) (same); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-1-696 (1987) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (West 1984)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-13-1.5 (West 2000) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-511
(West 2005) (same); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-101 (1996) (same); see also Rob Toon-
kel, Governor's Signature Makes English the Official Language of Kansas (May 11,
2007), http://www.us-english.org/inc/news/preleases/viewRelease.asp?ID=252
(last visited Apr. 14, 2008) (noting that Kansas passed legislation in May 2007 mak-
ing English official language). While many of the initial declarations were merely
symbolic, the more recent declarations appear to be a byproduct of the growing
anti-immigration sentiment within the United States. Compare Gutierrez v. Mun.
Ct. of S.E. Jud. Dist., 848 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988); Oklahoma High Court: English-
Only Plan is Unconstitutional, ASSOCIATED PREss, Apr. 3, 2002, http://www.freedom
forum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD=15998 ("[T]wenty-two other
states have laws adopting English as the official language but are non-prohibitive,
brief and symbolic."), Arizona High Court Finds English-Only Law Unconstitutional,
ASSOCIATED PREss, Apr. 29, 1998, http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/docu-
ment.asp? ("[M]ost [official English declarations] are largely symbolic .... ), with
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that
initiative to pass state constitution amendment was created by interest group, not
legislature), and ACLU Fails to Stop English-Only Law (Sept. 6, 2001), http://new-
smax.com/archives/articles/2001 /9/5/200046.shtml (discussing voter approved
English-only policy in Utah).
9. See generally Christopher D. R. Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their
Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules
as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA RAZA
LJ. 261, 262-64 (1998) (discussing English-only rules in workplace); James Leo-
nard, Bilingualism and Equality: Title VII Claims for Language Discrimination in the
Workplace, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 58-61 (2004) (explaining popularity growth
of English-only rules in business setting); Steven I. Locke, Language Discrimination
and English-Only Rules in the Workplace: The Case for Legislative Amendment of Title VII,
[Vol. 53: p. 595
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mate business necessity or safety concerns, arguably many English-only
rules are linked to the building xenophobia within the nation. 10 There-
fore, courts should be inherently suspicious of English-only rules because
of their propensity to act as a cloak for discrimination.1 '
In recent decades, anti-immigration sentiments have been increas-
ing.12 Consequently, it is unsurprising that private business owners and
states have enacted rules to make English the official language of their
respective workplaces and states.13 History frequently repeats itself.14 En-
27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 63-71 (1996) (considering role of English-only rules in
workplace).
10. See Mark L. Adams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and Workplace Language Re-
strictions, 74 OR. L. REv. 849, 849-50 (1995) (arguing English-only rules are product
of xenophobia); Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 7-8, Aug. 5, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/O5mmigration-t./html?
(highlighting how Hispanic neighbors believed their town debate on illegal immi-
gration felt more like condemnation of Hispanic culture); Manuel Munoz, Leave
Your Name at the Border, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at A19 ("Spanish was and still is
viewed with suspicion: always the language of the vilified illegal immigrant.");
Anthony Stitt, English-only Rule: Safety Issue or Discrimination?, COURIER TIMES, Mar.
20, 2000, available at http://www.englishfirst.org/workplace/workplaceestee-
lauder.htm (statement of Marielena Hincapie, civil rights lawyer in San Francisco)
("English-only rules are due to xenophobia .... People are afraid of other lan-
guages being spoken. They are afraid other nationalities are taking over the work
force. That fear leads us to creating rules like this.").
11. See Locke, supra note 9, at 53-62 (recounting body of English-only case law
where courts uphold rules as business necessity).
12. See Adams, supra note 10, at 849-50 (noting rise in enactment of English-
only rules and EEOC law suits); Kotlowitz, supra note 10, at I (recounting how "the
texture of the town changed significantly" during 1990s); Munoz, supra note 10, at
A19 (discussing American public's racial animus and Hispanic efforts to
assimilate).
13. For further discussion of America's anti-immigration sentiments, see supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
14. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION: 2003 1 (2004)
(noting Latin Americans comprise 53.3% of foreign born immigrants); U.S. CEN-
sus BUREAU, THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION: 2000 2 (2003) ("Between 1990 and
2000, the foreign-born population increased by 57 percent, from 19.8 million to
31.1 million, compared with an increase of 9.3 percent for the native population
and 13 percent for the total U.S. population."); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF
THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1997 13, tbl. 3-1 (1997);
Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Symposium, Latinas in Legal Education Through the Doors
of Opportunity: Assimilation, Marginalization, Cooperation or Transformation ?, 13 Am. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 109, 119 (2005) (refuting notion that Latino immigra-
tion wave differs from prior waves because Latinos pose threat to American val-
ues); EllislslandRecords.org, The Peopling of America, http://ellisislandrecords.
org/immex/weix-5-3.asp? (last visited Aug. 25, 2007) (providing historical back-
ground and statistics); Paul Lombardo, Image Archive on the American Eugenics
Movement, Eugenics Laws Restricting Immigration, http://www.etigenicsarchive.org/
html/eugenics/essaygtext.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007) ("The resulting law, the
Immigration Act of 1924, was designed consciously to halt the immigration of sup-
posedly 'dysgenic' Italians and eastern European Jews, whose numbers had
mushroomed during the period from 1900 to 1920."); US English, Inc., http://
www.us-english.org (last visited Aug. 25, 2007) (arguing English should be official
language of United States and explaining that learning English is first step towards
3
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glish-only rules seem to be the natural response to the growing uneasiness
many Americans feel about the recent flux of immigrants.
1 5
assimilation). At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States experienced
an immigration wave not unlike today's immigration wave. See U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAu, THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION: 2003, supra, at 1 (noting today's immigra-
tion wave seems to be predominately composed of Latinos). Between 1890 and
1930, 4.6 million Italians immigrated to the United States, making Italians by far
the largest immigrant population. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF THE FOR-
EIGN BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1997, supra (providing statistics of
United States immigration). Upon arrival, many Italians chose not to learn En-
glish, or never had to learn English because they stayed within their own cultural
enclaves. See GENE P. VERONESI, ITALIAN-AMERICANS & THEIR COMMUNITIES OF
CLEVELAND 139 (Cleveland State University Library 1977), available at http://
www.clevelandmemory.org/italians/partii.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007) (blam-
ing 1924 Immigration quota partially on Italians' failure to assimilate). The flux of
immigrants resisting assimilation-coupled with the outbreak of World War I-
caused the American peoples' view on immigration to shift from one of open
doors to one of nationalist sentiment. See EllislslandRecords.org, supra (noting
outbreak of World War I caused rise in nationalism and suspicion of immigrants).
Today's situation is not much different. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOR-
EIGN BORN POPULATION: 2002 (2003) (providing statistics of Latin American immi-
gration that mirror Italian immigrant wave). The important discrepancy between
the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is which groups are immigrat-
ing, being that Americans tend to direct anti-immigration sentiments at the most
visible migrant group. See Lombardo, supra, (emphasizing that Americans are con-
cerned with polluting American population with "inferior stock," regardless of na-
tionality). From 1850 to 1970, Irish, Germans and Italians respectively comprised
the largest percentage of immigrants. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF THE
FOREIGN BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1997, supra, at 13, tbl. 3-1 (pro-
viding statistics of largest immigrant populations per decade). Since the 1980s,
Mexicans and Latin Americans have continuously comprised the largest immigrant
group, and like their Italian predecessors, Latin Americans strive to retain their
culture. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION: 2003, supra, at 1
(reporting that Latin Americans comprised 53.3% of 2003 immigration popula-
tion). Either way, as one scholar noted, "change can be quite threatening and the
'browning of America' has been met with some alarm." Lopez, supra, at 119.
15. See Leonard, supra note 9, at 58 (citing fact that one in five homes speaks
different language as contributing factor to rise in English-only rules); see also
Kotlowitz, supra note 10 ("[W]hile illegal aliens are looking for their dreams, the
American people are losing theirs."); Ellis Island Foundation, Inc., The Peopling
of America, http://www.ellisisland.org/immex/wseix-5_5.asp? (last visited Aug.
25, 2007) (noting that economic recession in early 1990s caused resurgence of
anti-immigration sentiments because Americans believed that large immigration
wave stunted economic growth). At the turn of the twentieth century, skyrocketing
immigration numbers scared many Americans, resulting in a call for restricting the
number of immigrants. See Lombardo, supra note 14 (stating number of immi-
grants troubled Americans, leading to eugenics movement). Propelled by a grow-
ing concern about the increasing competition from cheap foreign labor,
Americans turned to eugenics to make biological arguments for restricting choice
immigrant groups. See id. (explaining that Americans turned to biological and
scientific arguments to restrict immigration). In 1924, after being convinced by
eugenics professionals that "the American gene pool was being polluted by a rising
tide of intellectually and morally defective people," Congress passed the Immigra-
tion Restriction Act of 1924, which scaled down the number of immigrants based
on their present percentage of the United States population according to the
1890s. See id. (discussing passage of 1924 Act).
[Vol. 53: p. 595
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In the business realm, alarmed employers responded by enacting En-
glish-only rules.16 Cloaked in terms like "business necessity" and "work-
place harmony," English-only rules commonly pass judicial scrutiny,
arguably because many courts refuse to apply the EEOC guidelines.
17
Only the Tenth Circuit, in Maldonado v. City of Atlus,18 recognized the in-
herently discriminatory nature of the English-only rules, a proposition the
EEOC propounded for years. 19
16. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wynell, Inc., 91 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
that employer had enacted English-only rule to prevent Hispanic employees from
communicating); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993)
(describing how employer had enacted English-only rule to prohibit employees
from speaking Spanish on job); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980)
(illustrating how English-only rules are directed at prohibiting use of Spanish on
job); Gonzalo v. All Island Transp., No. CV-04-3452, 2007 WL 642959, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007) (summarizing employer's attempt to prohibit Spanish);
EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (reporting
how English-only rule was designed to prevent workers from communicating in
Spanish); EEOC v. Beauty Enter., No. 3:01CV378 (AHN), 2005 WL 2764822, at *1
(D. Conn. Oct. 25, 2005) (noting employees alleged that English-only rules are
"enforced more frequently and more aggressively against Hispanics"); Velasquez v.
Goldwater Mem'l Hosp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 257, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing rule
as "no-Spanish" rule instead of English-only rule); Roman v. Cornell Univ., 53 F.
Supp. 2d 223, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (analyzing employee's claim that she was dis-
criminated against in part because of her Hispanic heritage); Long v. First Union
Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 942 (E.D. Va. 1995) (explaining that employer's
English-only rule was implemented in response to complaints); Gonzalez v. Salva-
tion Army, No. 89-1679-CIV-T-17, 1991 WL 11009376, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 3,
1991) (noting English-only rule prevented bilingual employees from communicat-
ing in Spanish); see also EEOC, EEOC Litigation Settlements: July 2003, Jan. 9, 2004,
http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/settlements/settlement07-03.html (highlighting
$1.5 million settlement agreement for Hispanic housekeeping staff subjected to
blanket English-only rules at Colorado Central Station Casino, Inc.).
17. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (holding that employers have undeniable
right to limit employee conversations during work hours); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty
Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that demographic and mar-
keting concerns constituted valid business necessity for implementing English-only
rule); Gloor, 618 F.2d at 267 (holding that employer's enactment of English-only
rule to better serve customers was legitimate business necessity); Gonzalo, 2007 WL
642959, at *2 (holding that English-only rule was business necessity to prevent mis-
communication between taxi dispatchers and drivers); Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at
416-17 (determining that English-only rule met business necessity requirement be-
cause customers preferred English speaking sales representatives); Roman, 53 F.
Supp. 2d at 237 (explaining that English-only rule was necessary to alleviate inter-
personal, racial tensions); Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (deciding that English-only rule was justified by need to improve
interpersonal relations among Church employees); Prado v. L. Luria & Son, Inc.,
975 F. Supp. 1349, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (concluding that supervisory need to
understand employees constituted business necessity); Long, 894 F. Supp. at 940
(holding that English-only rule justifiable to alleviate tensions between Spanish
and non-Spanish speaking employees).
18. 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006), overruled in part by Metzler v. Fed. Home
Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006).
19. See id. at 1306 (acknowledging EEOC guidelines' burden-shifting argu-
ment that employers should bear burden of showing why English-only rule is
necessary).
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This Note discusses the current circuit split over English-only rules
and the proper role of the EEOC guidelines. 20 Part II discusses the vari-
ous litigation theories plaintiffs utilize to challenge English-only rules and
the integral role of the EEOC guidelines with these claims. 2 1 Part III pro-
vides a detailed analysis of how these claims played out in conjunction with
the EEOC guidelines and concludes that courts should follow the Gutierrez
v. Municipal Court of Southeast Judicial District., Los Angeles22 and Maldonado
court approaches, in particular, their deference to the EEOC guidelines
and acknowledgement that English-only rules may be discriminatory in
nature.
23
Part IV provides an analysis of the problems with the current gov-
erning circuit court case law. 24 Finally, Part V offers alternative solutions
for addressing language problems in the workplace or, at least, how to
properly tailor English-only rules to minimize or prevent discrimination.
25
This Note ultimately concludes that although there are real business ne-
cessities that justify English-only rules, the present case law does not pro-
vide employees with adequate protection against employers' anti-
immigration and discriminatory motives for implementing English-only
rules.2 6 To this end, courts have failed to conduct a "more searchingjudi-
cial inquiry," which is necessary to shield non-English and bilingual speak-
ers against the inherently discriminatory nature of English-only rules.
27
20. For further discussion of the EEOC guidelines' proper role, see infra
notes 153-200 and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of the various litigation theories available for em-
ployees to challenge English-only rules, see infra notes 28-68 and accompanying
text.
22. 848 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
23. For further discussion of how courts have approached English-only rules,
either upholding or striking the rules down, see infra notes 69-152 and accompany-
ing text.
24. For further discussion of problems with current case law, see infra notes
153-217 and accompanying text. Overall, the majority approach to the EEOC
guidelines, business necessity, workplace hostility and adherence to the characteri-
zation of language usage as merely a preference, permits employers to use these
factors as justification to uphold what are often discriminatory English-only rules.
For a further discussion of courts' justifications for allowing English-only rules and
refusing to adopt the EEOC guidelines, see infra notes 108-140 and accompanying
text.
25. For further discussion of alternative methods employers could use in lieu
of English-only rules to resolve business problems and necessity, see infra notes
229-31 and accompanying text.
26. For further discussion of the notions that English-only rules are inherently
discriminatory and that case law does not adequately address the discriminatory
danger of these rules, see infra notes 153-234 and accompanying text.
27. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (ex-
plaining that cases of minority discrimination should be subject to stricter review).
[Vol. 53: p. 595
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II. LITIGATION THEORIES: PICKING A STRATEGY FOR BATTLE
A garden variety of litigation theories exist for employees to challenge
their employers who implement English-only rules.28 Claims brought
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Tide VII) are arguably the
most common litigation theories presented; however, the success of these
suits usually rests on the court's approach to the EEOC guidelines. 29 Ad-
ditionally, employees may initiate claims under the Civil Rights Act of
1966-generally referred to as Section 1981 and Section 1983 claims-
against employers, depending on whether their employers are private or
public employers. 30 Finally, employees may pursue actions against public
employers based on First Amendment claims.
3 1
A. Title VII Claims: A Brief History
By enacting Title VII, Congress sought to eradicate employment prac-
tices that appear neutral on their face, but discriminate in application.
32
The passage of Title VII created the EEOC, an administrative agency that
was supposed to be the enforcement mechanism of Tide VII. 33 Because
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting speech); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983
(1996) (providing private and public employee discrimination suits); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1964) (providing employment discrimination actions).
29. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 78-80 (summarizing courts' approaches to dis-
parate impact versus treatment cases and constitutional claims).
30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1996) (permitting suits against private and
public employers).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting freedom of speech).
32. See Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977) (recounting how employer "regularly and purposefully treated Negroes
and Spanish-surnamed Americans less favorably than white persons"); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("The objective of Congress... [was
to remove] tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent ... [but]
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion and
national origin). Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
§ 2000e-2.
33. See 21 Am. JUR. Trials §4, at 1 (2007) (recounting history of Title VII of
1964 Civil Rights Act and birth of EEOC). During the creation of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act (1964 Act), parties divided over Title VII and the EEOC's power, result-
ing in a filibuster. See id. (theorizing that disagreement over whether to give EEOC
full executive administrative agency powers caused 1964 filibuster). To save the
1964 Act, members of Congress agreed to the Dirksen-Mansfield Compromise,
which stripped the EEOC of its enforcement powers to compel compliance with
2008] NOTE
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Title VII only allowed the EEOC to bring causes of action against employ-
ers who engaged in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination, Title VII's
private right of action became instrumental in employment discrimination
suits.
3 4
Both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims may be brought
under Title VII.3 5 These litigation theories are not mutually exclusive.
3 6
Therefore, employees commonly pursue both claims because each theory
contains weaknesses.
37
1. Title VII Disparate Treatment Claims: Intentional Discrimination Theory
Under a disparate treatment claim, employees advance an intentional
discrimination claim that entails a three step burden-shifting formula.38
To succeed, plaintiff employee must first make out a prima facie case that
the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee based on
national origin.39 If plaintiff employee succeeds in establishing a prima
Title VII. See id. (agreeing to shift burden onto private party bringing suit). Subse-
quently, the EEOC could only seek voluntary resolution of disputes or initiate em-
ployment suits where the employer engaged in a "pattern or practice" of
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (describing limited conditions under
which attorney general may act). Thus, the private right of action granted under
Title VII became imperative to employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (permitting
employee to file private suit).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (creating private right of action); 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-6 (granting EEOC limited authority to bring suits). Title VII's private
right of action does not allow employees to run out and file discrimination claims
on a whim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (describing requirements for suit). Employees
must achieve administrative exhaustion first. See Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425
U.S. 820, 832 (1976) (stressing that exhaustion of administrative remedies is re-
quired before employees may file private action); Briones v. Runyon, 101 F.3d 287,
289 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring administrative exhaustion before initiating private
claim) (citations omitted); Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1995)
(same) (citing Brown, 425 U.S. 820); Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 413
(9th Cir. 1985) (citing Brown, 425 U.S. 820) (same). Only after the EEOC investi-
gates the employee's allegations may an employee pursue a Title VII claim. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (requiring employee to continue cooperating with EEOC even
after administrative exhaustion).
35. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (laying out all of Title VII).
36. See HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 85-86 (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2d ed. 1995) (explaining that 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1) distin-
guishes between two theories and that Supreme Court acknowledged they are
functionally equivalent but nonetheless may be asserted as alternative theories).
37. See id. (same).
38. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-05 (1973) (es-
tablishing three-step burden-shifting analysis for private, non-class action employ-
ment discrimination case); see also Lynch, supra note 7, at 72-74 (emphasizing
difficulty of success under disparate treatment due to requirement of proving in-
tent and burden of persuasion remaining with plaintiff at all times).
39. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (placing initial burden of proof on
plaintiff to establish prima facie case of discrimination). In McDonnell Douglas, the
Supreme Court set out the necessary requirements to make out a prima facie case
of discrimination. See id. (requiring plaintiff prove that discrimination suffered
was due to minority status). Accordingly, an employee must provide evidence that
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facie case of intentional discrimination, then the burden shifts to defen-
dant employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory [business]
reason" for implementing the business practice. 40 Finally, if defendant
employer proves business necessity warranted his or her actions, then the
burden shifts back to plaintiff employee to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that defendant employer's practice nevertheless amounts to
discrimination .41
2. Title VII Disparate Impact Claims: Unintentional Discrimination Theory
In 1971, upon handing down Griggs v. Duke Power,4 2 the Supreme
Court created the disparate impact claim.43 Like a disparate treatment
(1) the employee is a member of a racial minority; (2) the employee applied for an
open position for which the employee is qualified; (3) the employee was denied
the position; and (4) the employer continued to seek applicants of similar qualifi-
cations as the plaintiff. See id. (listing requirements). Nevertheless, the required
prima facie showing does not appear to be as outcome determinative as whether
the court will defer to the EEOC guidelines. See id. (noting there are other bur-
dens of proof that may persuade court to find against plaintiff). If the court will
defer to the EEOC's policy guidelines, issued after the 1991 Civil Rights Act, then
plaintiff will not be required to prove employer's intent using direct evidence. See
EEOC: Revised Enforcement Guide on Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory,
8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 859, 405:6915 (July 7, 1992) (explaining that existence
of English-only rule is sufficient to satisfy plaintiff employee's prima facie burden).
Rather, the court will infer the discriminatory intent of an employer based on the
inherently discriminatory nature of English-only rules. See id. (emphasizing dis-
criminatory nature of English-only rules).
40. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803 (establishing business owner's bur-
den of proof).
41. See id. at 1824-25 (noting that lower court ignored this prong after deter-
mining employer presented legitimate business reason); see also, Int'l Bd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (holding that after employer
satisfied employer's burden of proof, burden shifted back to employee). After the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff, then plaintiff "ultimately ha[s] to prove more
than the mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory
acts. It ha[s] to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimi-
nation was the company's standard operating procedure." See Int'l Bd. of Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 336 (describing plaintiffs burden of proof).
42. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
43. See id. at 433-36 (creating disparate impact claim). Interestingly, even
though Congress implicitly recognized the Supreme Court's creation of the dispa-
rate impact claim during the drafting of the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Congress did not actually codify the disparate claim until the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act). See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business
Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L. REx,. 896, 899-903 (1993) (recounting enactment of
1991 Act as means to overrule Wards Cove decision). With the 1991 Act, Congress
acted in response to growing discord between courts, business employers and em-
ployees over the definition of "business necessity." See id. at 897 (addressing dis-
pute over definition of "business necessity" generated by conflicting court rulings).
Additionally, the 1991 Act sought to resolve issues regarding the required burden-
shifting analysis. See id. (noting how some courts would ignore burden-shifting
analysis). Congress firmly rejected the Court's approach in Wards Cove that many
employers advocated because it increased the level of specificity required to make
out a prima facie case, reduced the employer's burden when proving business ne-
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claim, the court engages in the burden-shifting analysis. 4 4 A disparate im-
pact claim, however, is markedly more favorable to plaintiff employees be-
cause this claim does not require employees to prove that the employer
intentionally discriminated. 45 Thus, employees are more likely to meet
their initial burden of proof if they pursue a disparate impact claim.
46 If
the employee succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, then the burden
shifts to the employer to "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity."
47
B. Section 1981: Intentional Discrimination Theory
Although Section 1981 does not expressly prohibit national origin dis-
crimination, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,48 the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the statute's prohibitions to extend to national origin
discrimination. 49 Like a Title VII disparate treatment claim, Section 1981
aims to prohibit intentional discrimination in the public and private work-
place by ensuring equal enforcement of contracts. 50 Section 1981 claims
cessity and watered down the business necessity standard. See Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645, 657-58 (1989) (holding that plaintiffs must make
affirmative showing to meet their prima facie burden and relaxing business justifi-
cation requirements); see also The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Stan-
dard, supra, at 897-901 (highlighting that Congress's disapproval of Wards Cove
propelled proposal to codify Griggs standard). Thus, as a direct result of the 1991
Act, the burden-shifting analysis that requires businesses to prove business neces-
sity when faced with a prima facie charge of employment discrimination remains
intact today. See id. at 910 (emphasizing that courts cannot use Wards Cove despite
any ambiguities in 1991 Act's language).
44. See Criggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (applying burden-shifting analysis after con-
cluding plaintiffs had met their prima facie burden).
45. Compare Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (emphasizing
prima facie disparate impact claim does not require specific circumstantial or di-
rect evidence), with Long v. First Union, 86 F.3d 1151, 1151 (4th Cir. 1996) (un-
published table decision) (agreeing that prima facie case does not require specific
circumstantial or direct evidence, but, nevertheless, required plaintiff to meet
stringent requirements to make out prima facie case of discrimination).
46. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, supra note
43, at 897 (explaining how plaintiffs can meet their initial burden of proof).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2) (k) (1) (A).
48. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
49. See id. at 613 ("Based on the history of § 1981, we have little trouble in
concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable
classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of
their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.").
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(c) (1991) (stating everyone is entitled to equal
rights including "making, performance, modification, and termination of con-
tracts"); see also PERRITr, supra note 36, at 113 (explaining application of Section
1981). Section 1981 expressly seeks to protect employees "against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law." 42
U.S.C. § 1981(c). While these sections initially allowed employees to bring claims
against both public and private employers, their scope remained limited until the
1991 Civil Rights Act. See PERirr, supra note 36, at 107-113 (explaining how 1991
604
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require employees to survive the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green5 1 bur-
den-shifting analysis. 5 2 First, the McDonnell Douglas analysis requires plain-
tiffs to carry the initial burden of proof by "establishing a prima facie case
of racial discrimination." 53 Second, if plaintiff employee makes this show-
ing, the burden of proof shifts to defendant employer to prove that the
business practice was developed out of business necessity.5 4 Finally, the
burden shifts back to plaintiff employee to prove that despite the apparent
business necessity, defendant employer still discriminated against plaintiff
employee on account of the employee's national origin.55 Even though
both intentional discrimination claims seem identical, they are not mutu-
ally exclusive.5 6 Nevertheless, employees may favor a Section 1981 litiga-
tion theory because Section 1981 claims do not require administrative
exhaustion, but do allow for jury trials and compensatory and punitive
damages.
5 7
C. Section 1983 Claims: Deprivation of Constitutional Rights
In addition to Title VII, Section 1983 is another means of bringing an
intentional discrimination action.5 8 Section 1983 claims, however, differ
from Title VII and Section 1981 claims because Section 1983 claims are
Amendments overruled Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. to preserve disparate
impact claim). In 1991, Congress amended Section 1981, adding section (b),
which redefined "mak[ing] and enforce[ment]" of contracts to include "making
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyments of
all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (b). By extending the scope of Section 1981, Congress enabled em-
ployees to assert claims challenging English-only rules. See PERiurr, supra note 36,
at 97 (citing Von Zuckerman v. Argonne Nat'l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467, 1472 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1993)) (arguing that "make and enforce contracts" should be broadly
defined).
51. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
52. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (utilizing
burden-shifting approach and requiring plaintiff to meet initial burden); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 792 (setting forth burden-shifting analysis for evalua-
tion of Title VII claims); Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 726 (3d Cir. 1988)
(employing burden-shifting approach); Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d
798, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1982) (using burden-shifting approach).
53. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (establishing requirement for Title VII
plaintiffs to carry initial burden of proof).
54. See id. ("The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason .... ).
55. See id. at 803-805 (shifting burden of proof back to plaintiff if defendant
satisfactorily proves practices are nondiscriminatory).
56. SeeJohnson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (affirming
that "the aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other remedies he pos-
sesses"); see also Lynch, supra note 7, at 74-75 (explaining Title VII and Section
1981 claims are not mutually exclusive, but Section 1981 litigants may only pro-
ceed on purposeful discrimination theory).
57. See PERRIT, supra note 36, at 85 (exploring alternative of proceeding under
disparate treatment theory rather than disparate impact theory).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1993) (creating public cause of action for depriva-
tion of rights).
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limited to public employers. 59 Section 1983 allows state and federal gov-
ernment employees to bring suits against employers for deprivations of
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitutions and
laws." 60 In short, the provision protects federal rights.6 1 Accordingly,
courts interpret Section 1983 to extend to disparate treatment claims.
62
Like Section 1981 and Title VII claims, Section 1983 claims are intentional
discrimination suits; therefore, the same burden-shifting formula utilized
in Title VII claims also applies to the adjudication of Section 1983
claims. 63
When pursuing Section 1983 claims, plaintiff employees may assert
various litigation theories, including deprivation of one's equal protection
rights preserved in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and depriva-
tion of free speech rights contained in the First Amendment. 64 Even
though the assertion that English-only rules deprive employees of their
freedom of speech may seem like the most obvious claim for plaintiff em-
ployees, courts have not uniformly accepted or rejected this litigation the-
ory.65 The success of First Amendment claims appears to turn on the
59. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971) (specifying deprivation
of right must occur under color of state law); Poolaw v. City of Anadarko, 660 F.2d
459, 462 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985) (holding Section 1983
suits are limited to discriminatory employment practices involving state action).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (defining scope of statute); see also Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1228-33 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing
employee's alleged First Amendment deprivation); Lynch, supra note 7, at 76 (ex-
plaining employees have pursued claims alleging deprivation of Equal Protection
Clause of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (defining scope of statute).
62. See Daniels v. Bd. of Educ. of Ravenna City Sch. Dist., 805 F.2d 203, 207
(6th Cir. 1986) ("Like disparate treatment under Title VII, sections 1981 and 1983
require proof of purposeful discrimination. Thus, the order and allocation of
proof, applicable in a disparate treatment case under Title VII, may be utilized in
adjudicating race discrimination claims arising under sections 1981 and 1983.")
(internal citations omitted).
63. See id. at 207 (asserting Title VII burden-shifting approach should also
apply to Sections 1981 and 1983); Poolaw, 660 F.2d at 462 (holding that burden-
shifting applies to Section 1983 claims).
64. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, V, XIV (granting equal protection and free
speech rights); see also Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1309 (10th Cir.
2006) (discussing whether city's English-only policy violated city employees' free
speech rights); Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 93144 (9th
Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated as moot, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (discussing whether Ari-
zona's recently added Article XXVII, which made English official language of Ari-
zona, violated public employee's free speech rights); Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of S.E.
Jud. Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1049 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing employees' argument
that English-only rules violate Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
because they intentionally discriminate against employees based on national
origin).
65. Compare Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 942 (holding that language limitation is public
concern because it prevents those with language limitations from obtaining impor-
tant government information), with Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1310-11 (holding that
language limitation is not public concern because employees' speech in question
was not protected speech).
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court's characterization of the claim.66 Claims focusing on the public's
right to receive information from the government seem to be more suc-
cessful than claims that argue English-only rules deprive employees of
their freedom of speech. 6 7 Nevertheless, as one scholar has argued, em-
ployee claims that assert English-only rules deprive them of their First
Amendment rights could be successful. 68 In sum, constitutional argu-
66. Compare Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934-35 (characterizing issue as one where state
is impinging on pure speech rights), with Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1310 (portraying
issue as one where state may permissibly limit speech because limits only apply to
state government employees).
67. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934-35 (concluding prohibition of state government
employees from speaking other languages deprived public of right to informa-
tion). In Yniguez, the court ruled that restricting public employees to "act" only in
English violated the First Amendment. See id. at 928 (recognizing that although
state can limit government employee speech, it had unconstitutionally threatened
free speech of third parties). Nevertheless, the court's focus emphasized "the
many thousands of Arizonans who would be precluded from receiving essential
information from their state and local governments" rather than the employees'
right to freedom of expression. See id. at 923 (explaining concern grounded in
rights of listeners, not employee's freedom of speech). Importantly, the court also
highlighted that a body of constitutional law, dating back to the 1920s, supported
its finding that the government cannot use its regulatory powers to restrict speech.
See id. at 945 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)) (stating court's con-
cern about creating "an enlightened American citizenship"). Although the court's
decision noted that the intention of Article XXVIII, which made English the offi-
cial language of Arizona, had a desirable end-to unite all Arizonans by mandat-
ing everyone communicate in one language-the court ultimately concluded that
Article XXVIII was contrary to "our diverse and pluralistic society." See id. at 923
(finding official English amendment unconstitutional).
68. See Leah Bhimani, First Amendment-Government Employees-The Tenth Cir-
cuit Determines That Speaking Spanish is Not an Issue of Public Concern and Misapplies the
Mount Healthy Test to a Prior Restraint Claim, 60 SMU L. REv. 275, 275 (2007) (ar-
guing Maldonado court incorrectly decided case). Bhimani argued that the Tenth
Circuit's recent decision in Maldonado-which held that a municipality's enact-
ment of English-only rules did not violate employees' First Amendment fights-
applied an incorrect test to assess the employees claim, thereby potentially jeop-
ardizing future employee First Amendment claims. See id. at 275-76 (arguing court
incorrectly determined whether speech was matter of public concern). In Maldo-
nado, the court applied the Pickering-Mount Healthy test to determine whether the
city's English-only rule violated the First Amendment. See id. at 278 (asserting Pick-
ering-Mount Healthy test should not have been applied). This four prong test re-
quires that:
(1) The court determine whether the speech touches on a matter of pub-
lic concern. (2) If it does, the court must balance the interest of the em-
ployee in making the statement and the public employer's interest in
effectively providing public services. (3) If the preceding requirements
are met, the employee must show that the protected speech was a moti-
vating factor in the detrimental employment decision. (4) The employer
then has the opportunity to demonstrate that it would have made the
same employment decision in the absence of the protected speech.
Id. at 277-78 (outlining appropriate test). Applying this test, the Maldonado court
concluded that the employees' claim failed both the first and third prongs of the
Pickering-Mount Healthy test because they had not shown the English-only rule pro-
hibited speech of public concern nor that the rule limited communication of mat-
ters of public concern. See id. at 278 (summarizing court's findings). On the
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ments have not been particularly successful litigation methods for plaintiff
employees.
69
III. ENGLISH-ONLY CASE LAW: THE COURTS DUKE IT OUT OVER
EMPLOYMENT SPEECH ISSUES
A. The Courts Take Their First Swing at English-Only Rules
In Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service,7 0 the District Court of the Southern
District of Texas analyzed English-only rules for the first time. 7 1 There,
well drilling company Brothers Well discharged Saucedo, a bilingual Mexi-
can-American employee, after he uttered two words of Spanish to ask
where he should place a heavy metal pipe. 72 In its defense, Brothers Well
contended that well-drilling is a "demanding, dangerous [job] and re-
quires considerable teamwork."'7 3 Therefore, according to Brothers Well
its English-only rule was not discriminatory, but rather was a necessary bus-
iness precaution for employee safety.7 4 While the court accepted that
contrary, Bhimani argued that the Maldonado court not only applied the incorrect
test, but also that the employees' speech was protected and therefore, the court
never should have advanced to considering the third prong of the Pickering-Mount
Healthy test. See id. (concluding that court applied incorrect analysis).
Bhimani argued the court's failure to characterize English-only rules as an ex
ante restriction on speech caused its misapplication of the Pickering-Mount Healthy
test. See id. at 275. (emphasizing that English-only rules are ex ante speech restric-
tions). As the dissent suggested, the court should instead have applied the United
States v. National Treasury Employees Union test (NTEU test). See id. at 278 (explain-
ing that NTEU court dealt with ex ante speech restrictions). Whereas the NTEU
test examines ex ante restrictions on protected speech, the Pickering-Mount Healthy
test examines ex post restrictions on speech. See id. (highlighting difference be-
tween ex post and ex ante restrictions). Because English-only rules act as a prior
restraint-and therefore chill potentially protected speech-a more serious judi-
cial inquiry should apply. See id. at 278-79 (same). Overall, Bhimani argued, by
applying the Pickering-Mount Healthy approach, which is designed to examine ex
post restrictions on speech, the court denied the employees the requisite protec-
tion their speech deserved. See id. at 279 (stressing need to provide more protec-
tion with ex ante test).
69. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 931-32 (holding English-only amendment was un-
constitutional for reasons unrelated to employee's First Amendment claims); Mal-
donado, 433 F.3d at 1309 (asserting municipality's English-only rule did not violate
First Amendment because speech was not of public concern).
70. 464 F. Supp. 919 (9th Cir. 1979).
71. Compare id. at 921 (referring to "company rule"), with Garcia v. Gloor, 618
F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (describing rules as "English-only rules"). The Ninth
Circuit decided Saucedo before "English-only rule" was coined as a phrase. See
Lynch, supra note 7, at 76 (recounting how Saucedo spawned judicial debate about
English-only rules).
72. See Saucedo, 464 F. Supp. at 921 (recounting how Saucedo asked another
Mexican-American shopworker question in Spanish).
73. See id. at 920 (recounting defendant's argument).
74. See id. at 921 (summarizing defendant's argument about why company
rule was necessary safety and business rule). Additionally, Brothers Well provided
the court with company statistics to refute the allegation that the English-only rule
was discriminatory. See id. at 920 (taking notice that Brothers Well never adopted
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well-drilling is an inherently dangerous job, the court found that Saucedo
was not engaged in well-drilling at the time he spoke Spanish and there-
fore Brothers Well's argument was irrelevant. 75 Hence, the court held
that Saucedo's discharge was the result of "racial animus."
76
Despite the Ninth Circuit's unequivocal characterization of English-
only rules as inherently discriminatory, the Saucedo court's opinion lacked
the necessary legal reasoning and precedence to withstand future counter-
arguments posed by other circuit courts. 7 7 Consequently, when the Fifth
Circuit, in Garcia v. Gloor,78 considered whether English-only rules
amounted to discrimination, the court held in favor of English-only
rules.79 Most notably, the court asserted that when bilingual employees
speak in their native tongue, they are merely exercising a linguistic prefer-
ence; their ability to comply with English-only rules precludes any claims
of national origin discrimination.
80
In 1980, just one year after the Ninth Circuit wrestled with English-
only rules in Saucedo, Hector Garcia, a twenty-four year old bilingual Mexi-
can-American, challenged his discharge from work for violating his em-
ployer's English-only rule.8 1 In Gloor, the Fifth Circuit noted that Garcia's
employer limited the English-only rule to conversations at work, except
when conversing with Spanish-speaking customers or during break
policy of discrimination against Mexican-Americans). Approximately fifty percent
of Brothers Well employees were Mexican-Americans and the business operated in
an area where approximately thirty percent of the population was Mexican-Ameri-
can. See id. (noting demographic statistics). Moreover, Brothers Well stressed, the
actions in question were not taken by the business owners, but by supervisors in the
field. See id. (recognizing Brothers Well's argument, but noting that owners "per-
mitted and impliedly approved of the conduct of [the] foreman"). While the
court took note of the nondiscriminatory hiring practices employed by Brothers
Well, the court concluded the employers must be held responsible for the supervi-
sor's discriminatory actions taken against Saucedo. See id. at 922 (holding in favor
of plaintiff). In particular, the court noted the difficulty in finding good well work-
ers to conclude the business owners probably tolerated whatever discriminatory
practices their supervisors employed to maintain steady employees. See id. at 920
(understanding but not approving of Brothers Well's explanation for tolerating
foreman's discriminatory methods).
75. See id. at 921 (emphasizing that Saucedo was not engaged in well-drilling
when he spoke in English because drill he worked on was being repaired).
76. See id. at 920 ("The court merely holds that on the facts presented, it is
apparent to this court that John Saucedo was discharged because of racial
animus.").
77. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 77 ('judge Cowan did not provide a very thor-
ough legal analysis of the issue as only one case was cited in the opinion[.]").
78. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
79. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 77 (drawing attention to court's argument that
language is merely preference for bilingual employees).
80. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270 ("[T]here is no disparate impact if the rule is
one that the affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is a matter
of individual preference.").
81. See id. at 266 (summarizing facts of case and basis of Garcia's claim).
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hours.8 2 The incident precipitating Garcia's discharge occurred when an-
other Spanish-speaking employee inquired about a customer's item re-
quest.8 3 When Garcia responded in Spanish, Gloor terminated him. 84
In addressing Garcia's claim, the court set forth a comprehensive and
convincing rationale explaining why English-only rules are not discrimina-
tory.85 First, the court gave credence to the numerous business necessity
reasons advanced by Garcia's employer for implementing his English-only
rule. 86 Hiding behind the business judgment rule, the Fifth Circuit re-
fused to make employers accomplish their business goals through "less re-
strictive" means. 87 Second, the court asserted that language and national
82. See id. (stating facts of case); cf Saucedo v. Bros. Well Serv., 464 F. Supp.
919, 921 (9th Cir. 1979) (implying that Brothers Well's English-only rule was blan-
ket prohibition).
83. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266 (explaining event precipitating Garcia's
dismissal).
84. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266 ("[Garcia] testified that on June 10, 1975 he was
asked a question by another Mexican-American employee about an item requested
by a customer and he responded in Spanish."). Garcia's employer, Mr. Gloor, tes-
tified that Garcia's violation of the English-only rule was not the only reason for his
discharge. See id. (taking note of evidence presented to show that Garcia was not
satisfactory employee). Garcia was discharged for "failure to keep his inventory
current, failure to replenish the stock on display from stored merchandise, failure
to keep his area clean and failure to respond to numerous reprimands-as well as
for violation of the English-only rule." See id. (explaining reasons for discharge).
On the other hand, Garcia had received regular compliments on his work and a
$250 bonus in May 1975. See id. (explaining that management bestowed compli-
ments and provided year-end bonuses to encourage work performance). In light
of the fact that both sides presented conflicting evidence about Garcia's work per-
formance, the court decided to hone in on the single issue involving Garcia's
discharge for violation of Gloor's English-only rule. See id. at 266-67 (recogniz-
ing Gloor's argument that Garcia violated English-only rule frequently); cf also
Saucedo, 464 F. Supp. at 921 (discussing how casual exchange between Spanish-
speaking employees did not jeopardize anyone's safety). Similar to Saucedo, the
situation precipitating Garcia's discharge involved a situation where neither busi-
ness necessity nor workplace safety were viable reasons to object to Garcia's use of
Spanish. See Gloo, 618 F.2d at 266 (recounting that Garcia was answering question
asked by another Mexican-American employee concerning customer request).
85. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266-71 (explaining why English-only rules are not
discriminatory).
86. See id. at 267 (summarizing one of Mr. Gloor's arguments for why English-
only rule was necessary and justified).
Mr. Gloor testified that there were business reasons for the language pol-
icy: English-speaking customers objected to communications between
employees that they could not understand; pamphlets and trade litera-
ture were in English and were not available in Spanish, so it was impor-
tant for employees to be fluent in English apart from conversations with
English-speaking customers; if employees who normally spoke Spanish off
the job were required to speak English on the job at all times and not
only when waiting on English-speaking customers, they would improve
their English; and the rule would permit supervisors, who did not speak
Spanish, better to oversee the work of subordinates.
Id.
87. See id. at 271 (noting that judges, who do not have business experience,
should not try to preempt business owner's judgments or decisions). Being that
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origin cannot be equated because language is not an immutable character-
istic such as national origin.8 8 Drawing a distinction between monolingual
and bilingual employees, the court concluded that "there is no disparate
impact if the rule is one that the affected employee can readily observe
and nonobservance is a matter of individual preference." 89 As a result of
the Saucedo and Gloor courts' contradicting stances on English-only rules,
the EEOC intervened to provide guidance as to how these employment
practices should be treated under Title VII.9 0
B. EEOC Guidelines: The EEOC Enters the Ring
The EEOC crafted its guidelines in direct response to the holdings in
Saucedo and Gloor.91 In 1980, the EEOC promulgated its guidelines setting
forth how courts should approach Title VII claims of national origin dis-
crimination based on English-only rules. 92 Because Title VII created the
Gloor was the business owner, the court deferred to his decision and accepted his
litany of business necessity reasons. See id. (finding no evidence of discrimination,
court explained it could not preempt business employer's decision). By accepting
Gloor's business necessity arguments, the court provided future business owners
with numerous business necessity reasons to justify implementing English-only
rules. See id. (accepting argument that bilingual employees merely exercise prefer-
ence and that employee preferences are not protected rights).
88. See id. at 270 (asserting that language can only be equated with national
origin when person is monolingual, "but [that] case concerns only a requirement
that persons capable of speaking English do so while on duty"); cf 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7(a) (2008) ("The primary language of an individual is often an essential
national origin characteristic."). At trial, Garcia brought in an expert witness to
testify that the "Spanish language is the most important aspect of ethnic identifica-
tion for Mexican-Americans, and it is to them what skin color is to others." Gloor,
619 F.2d at 267 (recounting key testimony). In response, the court asserted that
language and national origin cannot be equated. See id. at 269 (cautioning that
cultural aspects of national origin, like language, cannot be equated to national
origin). In particular, "[n]ational origin must not be confused with ethnic or soci-
ocultural traits or an unrelated status, such as citizenship or alienage [." Id. at 269
(citations omitted). Additionally, the court highlighted that Title VII's list of pro-
hibited grounds for discrimination did not equate language with national origin.
See id. (explaining that Title VII only protects people from being discriminated
against on basis of immutable characteristics). Finally, the court argued that Title
VII only prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination based on immutable
characteristics, and language is a trait that can be changed by merely learning a
new language. See id. (same).
89. See id. at 270 (stating conclusion of court).
90. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 76-77 (recognizing that EEOC guidelines were
promulgated in response to Saucedo and Gloor).
91. See id. (same); see also Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269 (asserting national origin and
language cannot be equated); Saucedo v. Bros. Well Serv., 464 F. Supp. 919, 920
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding racial animus was impetus for Brothers Well's English-
only rule); Cameron, supra note 9, at 304 (explaining that EEOC guidelines were
enacted in reaction to Gloo's holding).
92. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1606.1, 1606.7 (2008) (calling for scrutiny of English-only
rules).
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EEOC as its administrative agency, the EEOC promulgated English-only
guidelines under their delegated agency authority.
93
The EEOC began by addressing whether language discrimination is
sufficiently related to national origin discrimination to support a Title VII
claim. 94 Answering this question in the affirmative, the EEOC expressly
asserted in Section 1606.1 of the EEOC guidelines that "national origin
discrimination [is] broadly [defined] as including ... cultural or linguistic
characteristics of a national origin group."9 5 Next, the EEOC addressed
the two different types of English-only rules: blanket prohibitions and tai-
lored rules.9 6
In Section 1606.7(a), the EEOC asserted that blanket prohibitions-
prohibitions that are "applied at all times"-are a "burdensome term and
condition of employment" because an individual's primary language usu-
ally is an essential characteristic of national origin. 9 7 The EEOC guide-
lines appear to capture the argument Garcia advanced in Gloor-namely,
that prohibiting use of one's primary language disadvantages workers on
the basis of national origin. 98 Additionally, the EEOC guidelines noted
93. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (citing Title VII as its source of authority); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2008) ("[Granting EEOC] authority from time to time to
issue . . . suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this sub-
chapter."). For a further discussion of the EEOC's role as executing agency of
Title VII, see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (defining what constitutes national origin discrimi-
nation); cf. Natalie Prescott, English Only at Work, Por Favor, 9 U. PA.J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 445, 454 (2007) ("[L]anguage does not implicate national origin
[discrimination].").
95. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (linking language spoken to national origin); see
also Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of S.E. Jud. Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 1988)
(listing various authorities for its assertion that language is inextricably tied to na-
tional origin); EEOC Compl. Man. Vol. 1I, §§ 623.2(a), 623.3(b) (2006)
("[L]anguage is often an essential national origin characteristic .... "); Lisa L.
Behm, Protecting Linguistic Minorities Under Title VII The Need for Judicial Deference to
the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 81 MARQ. L. REv.
569, 573-75 (1998) (arguing that Congress never explicitly defined national origin,
that Congress had little discussion over its meaning, that courts routinely associate
language with national origin and that EEOC guidelines consider language dis-
crimination to be national origin discrimination).
96. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a)-(b) (promulgating stance on blanket and tai-
lored English-only rules).
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (emphasizing that because primary language is
aspect of one's national origin, one is disadvantaged and made to feel uncomforta-
ble by prohibitions against using one's primary language).
98. See id. ("Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from speak-
ing their primary language or the language they speak most comfortably, disadvan-
tages an individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national origin.");
see also Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging Garcia's
argument that denying employees to speak in language most familiar to them de-
nies them employment privilege enjoyed by employees most comfortable with En-
glish); Behm, supra note 95, at 599 (arguing English-only rules discriminate
because they affect employee's ability to effectively communicate in workplace,
which is necessary element of job performance).
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that English-only rules have the propensity to create "an atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation and intimidation . . . which could result in a discrimi-
natory working environment."99 For these reasons, the EEOC guidelines
established that blanket English-only rules presumptively amount to na-
tional origin discrimination. 0 0
In Section 1606.7(b), the EEOC asserted that tailored English-only
rules-prohibitions that apply "only at certain times"-are discriminatory
unless employers can present a business necessity that warrants the prohi-
bition. 10 ' As a result of this two-pronged treatment, the EEOC guidelines
create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination in the context of En-
glish-only rules. 10 2 Employers may refute discrimination claims by
presenting business necessity or workplace safety arguments to justify their
English-only rules. 10 3 Finally, Section 1606.7(c), which directly responds
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a); see also Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294,
1301 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The English-only policy affects my work environment every
day. It reminds me every day that I am second-class and subject to rules for my
employment that the Anglo employees are not subject to."); EEOC v. Anchor
Coin, No. 01-B-0564 (D. Colo. July 21, 2003), explained in Eeoc Litigation Settle-
ments: July 2003, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/settlements/settle-
ment07-03.html (last visited Aug. 12th, 2008) (concluding that blanket English-
only rule applied in housekeeping department created hostile working environ-
ment); EEOC v. Premier Operator Serv., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D.
Tex. 2000) (declaring that English-only rule did not alleviate workplace hostility,
but rather exacerbated feelings of "alienation and inadequacy"); Wendy Olson,
The Shame of Spanish: Cultural Bias in English First Legislation, 11 CHICANO-LATINO L.
REv. 1, 24 (1991) (asserting that English-only rules inflict injury "of stigmatization,
or... of stamping non-English speakers with a badge of inferiority") (citations and
internal quotations omitted). See generally E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-446, 1970 WL 3571
(E.E.O.C. Nov. 5, 1970) (laying foundation for guidelines by holding English-only
rule directed at only employees with Spanish surnames created hostile
atmosphere).
100. See EEOC v. Synchron-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 914 (N.D.
Ill. 1999) (recognizing that EEOC guidelines say that English-only rules create in-
ference of discrimination); see also Premier, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (agreeing with
EEOC guidelines' stance that English-only rules disproportionately burden na-
tional origin minorities); Posting of Michael Moore to http://paemploymentlaw-
blog.com/articles/discrimination/ (July 10, 2007) ("In almost all cases where
there is a blanket prohibition on the use of a language other than English Courts
have sided with EEOC or employees.").
101. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) ("An employer may have a rule requiring that
employees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that
the rule is justified by business necessity.").
102. See id. (presuming English-only rules are discriminatory unless rebutted
by showing of business necessity).
103. See id. (same); see also E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 81-25, 1981 WL 17720, at *2
(E.E.O.C. July 6, 1981) (solidifying interpretation of EEOC guidelines' require-
ment that business necessity be legitimate); EEOC Compl. Man. Vol. II,
§§ 623.2(a), 623.3(b) (2006) (noting that Title VII will find English-only rules dis-
criminatory, unless backed by business necessity); EEOC New Investigator Train-
ing, Participant Man., Theories of Discrimination, 41 (2001) [hereinafter EEOC New
Investigator Training] ("The EEOC's policy on speak-English-only rules is that
such rules have an adverse impact based on national origin and therefore must be
justified by a showing of business necessity."). The EEOC New Investigator Manual
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to the Saucedo court's concern, requires employers to give employees effec-
tive notification of English-only rules and the consequences of viola-
tions.10 4 In particular, the EEOC emphasized that notice is imperative
because bilingual employees may casually revert back to their native lan-
guage, unknowingly subjecting themselves to cause for termination.10 5
While subsection (c) has not received much opposition, many courts
appear vehemently opposed to subsections (a) and (b).' 06 According to
some circuit courts, these subsections create an unfounded presumption
of discrimination that unfairly allow plaintiff employees to meet their ini-
tial prima facie burden of proof.'0 7 For this reason, many courts and em-
ployers oppose the EEOC guidelines because the guidelines change the
lists several examples of a permissible business necessity such as: (1) when commu-
nication with coworkers is imperative because they are performing surgery or
working with equipment where dangerous accidents could occur; (2) when speak-
ing with English-speaking customers and (3) when communicating with English-
speaking supervisors. See EEOC New Investigator Training, supra (providing exam-
ples of acceptable business necessities).
104. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (requiring employers provide their employees
with notice of English-only rule); see also Saucedo v. Bros. Well Serv., 464 F. Supp.
919, 921 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasizing that Saucedo was not formally informed
about English-only rule or repercussions for failing to comply).
105. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) ("It is common for individuals whose primary
language is not English to inadvertently change from speaking English to speaking
their primary language."); see also Premier, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (discussing
psycho-linguist's expert witness testimony regarding code-switching and problems
bilinguals face "turning off' their native language); Behm, supra note 95, at 592-96
(explaining many critics fail to consider English proficiency of bilinguals; however,
proficiency, or lack thereof, often causes lapses or inadvertent code switching).
106. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a)-(b) (instructing blanket prohibitions are to be
considered discriminatory and tailored rules only to be allowed if necessary); see
also Long v. First Union Corp. of Virginia, No. 95-1986, 1996 WL 281954, at *2 (4th
Cir. May 29, 1996) (unpublished table opinion) (requiring plaintiff employees to
prove prima facie discrimination); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489
(9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting EEOC guidelines' assertion that English-only rules cre-
ate inference of discrimination); Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, No. 89-1679-CIV-T-
17, 1991 WL 11009376, at *3 (M.D. Fla.June 3,1991), affd, 985 F.2d 578 (11th Cir.
1993) (affirmed without opinion) (adopting Gloor's approach to English-only rules
instead of deferring to EEOC's approach); Roman v. Cornell Univ., 53 F. Supp. 2d
223, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (supporting prior court rulings of Fourth, Fifth, Ninth
and Eleventh circuits to conclude English-only rules are not per se discriminatory);
Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (agreeing
with holdings of Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh circuits to conclude English-
only rules are not per se discriminatory).
107. See Long, 1996 WL 281954, at *2 (finding English-only rules inadequate
basis to sustain disparate impact claim); Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (rejecting
EEOC guidelines as "wrong" because English-only rules do not "inexorably lead to
an abusive [work] environment"); Gonzalez, 1991 WL 11009376, at *3 (holding En-
glish-only rule that requires employees to speak in English when in presence of
other English speakers is not discriminatory and without more does not constitute
discrimination).
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existing burden-shifting formula and force employers to bear the initial
burden of proof.108
C. The Courts Challenge the EEOC Guidelines
Despite the fact that Title VII created the EEOC as its executing ad-
ministrative authority, courts analyzing challenges to English-only rules re-
peatedly refused to defer to the EEOC guidelines. 10 9 These courts relied
on the Gloor court's characterization of language usage as merely a prefer-
ence.1 10 Because they believed that Mexican-Americans and other ethnici-
ties could control language usage, these courts refused to consider
English-only rules as inherently discriminatory.1 1' Thus, the few circuits
to hear challenges to English-only rules determined that the EEOC guide-
lines inappropriately altered Title VII's burden-shifting formula.1 12 Nev-
ertheless, not all courts have rejected the EEOC guidelines' assertion that
English-only rules are inherently discriminatory.
1 1 3
1. Round 1: The Ninth Circuit's Path to Rejecting the EEOC Guidelines
Following the promulgation of the EEOC guidelines the Ninth Cir-
cuit grappled with whether to adopt the EEOC's characterization of En-
glish-only rules as presumptively discriminatory in a series of three
cases. 1 14 In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty,115 a bilingual Mexican-American radio
announcer brought disparate impact and disparate treatment claims
108. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (declining to accept EEOC's assertion
that English-only rules "create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimida-
tion based on national origin" or that they are per se discriminatory).
109. See id. (declining to accept EEOC guidelines); Kania, 14 F. Supp. 2d at
735 (agreeing with Spun Steak's rejection of EEOC guidelines).
110. For a discussion of the courts that relied on Gloor's characterization of
language usage as merely a preference, see infra notes 118-19, 127, 133 and accom-
panying text.
111. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding English-
only rules are not discriminatory because "the rule is one that the affected [bilin-
gual] employee can readily observe and nonobservance is a matter of prefer-
ence"). For further discussion of courts relying on Gloor, see infra notes 119-20,
127, 133 and accompanying text.
112. See Long, 1996 WL 281954, at *2 (holding English-only rule alone was
inadequate and requiring proof of discrimination, in particular that rule was more
severely enforced against plaintiff than against other employees); Spun Steak, 998
F.2d at 1489 (rejecting EEOC guidelines because plaintiffs had not met prima facie
burden).
113. See generally Long, 1996 WL 281954 at *1 (issuing decision without ad-
dressing EEOC guidelines); Gonzalez, 1991 WL 11009376, at *2-3 (indirectly per-
forming burden-shifting analysis by accepting defendant employer's business
necessity arguments as acceptable to uphold English-only rule).
114. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (1993) (rejecting EEOC guidelines); Gu-
tierrez v. Mun. Ct. of S.E.Jud. Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting
EEOC guidelines); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir.
1987) (rejecting EEOC guidelines).
115. 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
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against KIIS radio station in Los Angeles. 1 16 In reviewing Jurado's claim,
the Ninth Circuit conducted the standard burden-shifting analysis.' 17 The
Jurado court disregarded the EEOC guidelines, holding thatJurado failed
to present a prima facie case of discrimination. 1 8 Most importantly, the
Ninth Circuit rested its holding on the Gloor court's characterization of
language usage as a preference. 119 Highlighting that Jurado was a bilin-
gual employee, the court emphasized that he could have easily complied
with the English-only order. 1 20
Just one year after the Ninth Circuit decided Jurado, that circuit court
made an about face, holding that the Los Angeles county court's English-
only rule discriminated against bilingual court employees in Gutierrez v.
Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District, County of Los Angeles.12 1 In
Gutierrez, the Ninth Circuit adopted the EEOC's assertion that language
and national origin were inextricably tied. 12 2 The Ninth Circuit struck
116. See id. at 1408 (setting forth basic facts of case). At the request of the
KIIS, Jurado began using "street" Spanish to attract ethnic listeners. According to
Arbitron marketing ratings, however, Jurado's street Spanish did not increase lis-
tener ratings among minorities. See id. (recounting employer's method to increase
listener base). Instead, the street Spanish confused current listeners so KIIS di-
rected Jurado to speak in English only. See id. (explaining how plan to use street
Spanish backfired). Shortly thereafter, KIIS fired Jurado. See id. (narrating con-
flicting stories of Jurado and radio station about events precipitating Jurado's
discharge).
117. See id. at 1409 (explaining that for plaintiff to prevail his claim must pass
McDonald Douglas' burden-shifting analysis and must establish prima facie case of
discrimination).
118. See id. (concluding Jurado's prima facie claim failed because he did not
provide sufficient evidence indicating KIIS fired him for racially motivated rea-
sons). The court concluded that the Arbitron ratings provided a sufficient busi-
ness necessity to rebut any allegations that KIIS acted out of racial animus. See id.
(noting that Arbitron ratings showed no increase in target Hispanic audience after
use of "street" Spanish); cf 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2008) (asserting that language re-
strictions disadvantage employees on basis of national origin).
119. See id. at 1411 ("An employer can properly enforce a limited, reasonable
and business-related English-only rule against an employee who can readily comply
with the rule and who voluntarily chooses not to observe it as 'a matter of individ-
ual preference."') (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)).
120. See id. (asserting that employers may enforce English-only rules against
bilingual employees because their language usage is "a matter of individual prefer-
ence") (citing Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270).
121. CompareGutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of S.E.Jud. Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1041 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that English-only rule was discriminatory even when enforced
against bilingual employees,), withJurado, 813 F.2d at 1411 (holding that language
usage for bilingual employees is matter of preference); see also Lynch, supra note 7,
at 80 (recognizing Gutierrez court's retreat from prior holding of Jurado).
122. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1038-39 (agreeing with EEOC guidelines that
language restrictions implicate national origin discrimination). The Ninth Circuit
emphasized that "[a] lthough an individual may learn English and become assimi-
lated into American society, his primary language remains an important link to his
ethnic culture and identity." Id. at 1039. Furthermore, America has long drawn its
strength from being a multicultural society; commentators agree that language is a
large factor that allows individuals to maintain their cultural identities. Cf id. (em-
phasizing that "[tihe mere fact that an employee is bilingual does not eliminate
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down the English-only rule, expressly adopting the EEOC guidelines' con-
clusion that English-only rule were inherently discriminatory, thus al-
lowing plaintiff employees to satisfy their prima facie burden. 123
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the EEOC guidelines
lingered for a only fleeting moment.' 24
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit reverted to its holding in Jurado, rejecting
the EEOC guidelines and requiring plaintiff employees to clearly establish
a prima facie case of discrimination in order to advance a Title VII or any
other disparate treatment claim. 125 In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 1 2 6 two bi-
lingual, Mexican-American employees working at a wholesale meat and
poultry factory sued their employer, Spun Steak, claiming that Spun
Steak's English-only rule discriminated against them based upon their na-
tional origin.' 27 Rather than adopting the EEOC guidelines' assertion
that language restrictions undoubtedly discriminate against ethnic em-
ployees, the court reverted to the Gloor court's characterization of lan-
guage usage as a mere preference.1 28 Under that analysis, the court not
only required plaintiff employees to establish a prima facie case of discrim-
ination, but also required plaintiff employees to prove that the discrimina-
tion was adverse and that the adverse impact was significant. 12 9 The Ninth
Circuit's holding in Spun Steak solidified its decision to reject the EEOC
guidelines.1 0 Accordingly, Gutierrez became an obsolete decision in the
Ninth Circuit.' 3
1
the relationship between his primary language and the culture that is derived from
his national origin") (citation omitted).
123. See id. at 1040 (agreeing with and adopting EEOC guidelines).
124. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (over-
ruling Guiterrez's adoption of EEOC guidelines).
125. See id. at 1487 (finding its holding consistent with Jurado holding); see also
Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1411 (rejecting EEOC guidelines and adopting Gloos analysis
of English-only rules).
126. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
127. See id. at 1483 (describing nature of case).
128. See id. at 1487 (arguing that language is privilege and that employers do
not have to allow employees to speak in their preferential language).
129. See id. at 1486 ("The crux of the dispute between Spun Steak and the
Spanish-speaking employees, however, is not over whether Hispanic workers will
disproportionately bear any adverse effects of the policy; rather, the dispute cen-
ters on whether the policy causes any adverse effects at all, and if it does, whether
the effects are significant.").
130. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 83-84 (focusing on Ninth Circuit's decision to
revert back to Jurado approach and its continued reliance on Gloor approach to
English-only rules).
131. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487-88 (holding its current decision to be
consistent with Jurado and reaffirming adoption of Gloor approach to English-only
rules).
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2. Round 2: The Eleventh Circuit's Jab
Prior to Spun Steak, in Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, 13 2 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed a lower court's decision regarding a bilingual employee's
claim that her employer, the Salvation Army, discriminated against her on
account of her national origin by implementing an English-only rule.
133
Without mentioning the EEOC guidelines or the requisite burden-shifting
analysis, the district court cited Gloor and held that English-only rules are
not discriminatory where the employee "has the ability to speak En-
glish." ]3 4 Moreover, the Gonzalez court reasoned that the Salvation Army
did not enact its English-only rule with the intent to discriminate; rather,
the rule served a legitimate business purpose, namely to quell complaints
of non Spanish-speaking employees and customers. 13 5 Once again, the
court glossed over the EEOC guidelines and further entrenched the
courts' deference to Gloor.
136
3. Round 3: The Fourth Circuit Follows Suit
In Long v. First Union Corp.,13 7 the Fourth Circuit struck down a dispa-
rate treatment claim filed by two bilingual Hispanic employees.13 8 The
employer was a bank that had enacted an English-only rule in response to
complaints from customers and employees. 139 Without mentioning the
EEOC guidelines, the Long court applied the burden-shifting analysis to
conclude that the employees failed to meet their initial prima facie bur-
den of proof.140 Thus, the Fourth Circuit implicitly rejected the EEOC
guidelines' presumption that English-only rules are inherently discrimina-
132. 1991 WL 11009376 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 1991) affd without opinion, 985
F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision).
133. See Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, No. 89-1679-CIV-T-17, 1991 WL
11009376, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 1991) (describing facts of case).
134. See id. (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980)) (relying on
Gloor's characterization of English-only rules as applied to bilingual employees as
matter of preference).
135. See id. (justifying decision in part upon recognized business necessity
exception).
136. See id. (adhering to Gloor approach by requiring bilingual employee to
provide more evidence than English-only rule in order to demonstrate prima facie
case of discrimination) (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 264 (5th Cir. 1980)).
137. 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
138. See id. (describing nature of case).
139. See id. (recounting that employees did not contest defendant employer's
reason for enacting English-only rule, but instead contested that English-only rule
was discriminatorily enforced against Hispanic employees).
140. See id. at 1151-52 (explaining that plaintiff employees failed to establish
prima facie burden of discrimination because employees could not prove that em-
ployer bank enforced English-only rule exclusively against Spanish-speaking em-
ployees and not employees of other nationalities).
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tory and did not allow plaintiff employees to automatically satisfy their ini-
tial burden of proof.
14 1
D. Case Law Enters a Clinch: The EEOC Guidelines' Gradual Comeback
After four circuits rejected the EEOC guidelines and held that En-
glish-only rules are nondiscriminatory business practices, case law sur-
rounding English-only rules appeared settled. 14 2 Employees needed to
show blatant discrimination in order to satisfy their prima facie burden
and to subsequently survive business necessity justifications. 14 3 The case
law overwhelmingly seemed to favor employers; however, the Tenth Cir-
cuit broke from this seemingly uniform national precedence in 2006.144
In Maldonado v. City of Altus, city employees alleged that the city's En-
glish-only rule discriminated against many bilingual Hispanic employees
on the basis of their national origin. 145 The Tenth Circuit in Maldonado
rejected the district court's conclusion that the plaintiff employees had
141. See id. (requiring that plaintiff employees make further evidentiary show-
ing rather than finding English-only rules per se discriminatory); see also Prescott,
supra note 94, at 451 (noting that Fourth Circuit upheld English-only rule as valid).
142. See generally Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
plaintiff employee had not met burden of proof because English-only rules are not
presumptively discriminatory when applied to bilingual employees); Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (relying on Gloor's reasoning to hold
that English-only rule was not discriminatory); Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, No. 89-
1679-CIV-T-17, 1991 WL 11009376, at *3 (M.D. Fla.June 3, 1991) (concluding that
English-only rule alone was not sufficient evidence of discrimination to make out
disparate impact claim); Long, 86 F.3d 1151 (asserting that English-only rule with-
out more was insufficient to make out disparate treatment claim); see also Prescott,
supra note 94, at 449-50 (noting that three out of four circuits upheld English-only
rules as valid business practices).
143. See Long, 86 F.3d at 1151-52 (explaining that employees needed to show
English-only rule discriminated against Hispanic employees in particular).
144. See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 2006),
overruled on different point of law by Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464
F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that English-only rules provide plaintiff
employee with enough evidence of discrimination in workplace to survive sum-
mary judgment on Title VII claim). The court noted that the scope of Title VII
claims is not limited to economic and tangible discrimination; it also encompasses
the workplace environment. See id. at 1303 (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115-16 (2002)). When conditions of discrimination in the
workplace become "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment," plaintiff em-
ployees have sufficient evidence of discrimination to bring a Title VII claim. See id.
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Because English-only
rules fall more heavily on bilingual employees than on other groups-and can thus
create a hostile work environment-those employees may bring Title VII claims
challenging English-only rules. See id. (explaining that businesses must employ
neutral business practices and that when businesses fail to treat employees equally,
employees may bring Title VII claims challenging employer's business practices,
even if employer did not intentionally discriminate against employees) (citations
omitted).
145. See id. at 1298 (describing nature of claim).
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failed to satisfy their prima facie burden. 14 6 Instead, the Tenth Circuit
recognized that English-only rules could in fact be construed as inherently
discriminatory. 147 Although the court expressly stated it was not adopting
the EEOC guidelines, the court nevertheless asserted that the proper ques-
tion was whether a rationaljuror could find that the impact of the English-
only rule on employees was sufficiently severe or pervasive such that it con-
stituted discrimination.1 4 8 The Supreme Court has stated that discrimina-
tion in the workplace becomes sufficiently severe or pervasive "[w] hen the
workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and in-
sult"' such that the workplace becomes an abusive environment. 149 The
Maldonado court stated that the EEOC guidelines support the conclusion
that a rationaljuror could find English-only rules discriminatory. 150 Based
on those assertions, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the trial
146. See id. at 1304 (rejecting district court's prior holding). Relying on Spun
Steak-presumably to characterize language usage as a preference-the district
court upheld the city's English-only rule; however, the Tenth Circuit rejected that
holding. See id. (disagreeing with district court's finding that English-only rules do
not impose significant adverse effects rising to level of discrimination necessary to
make out prima facie claim). According to the court, Spun Steak did not hold that
English-only rules are always permissible. See id. ("Even under Spun Steak, however,
English-only policies are not always permissible; each case turns on its facts.") (cit-
ing Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489). Rather, the Maldonado court held that courts
should make determinations on an ad hoc basis. See id. (same). Accordingly,
plaintiff employees should be able to present evidence of discrimination and have
their claims reviewed in light of the EEOC guidelines. See id. at 1305-06 (recogniz-
ing that although EEOC guidelines are not binding on courts, "it is enough that
the EEOC, based on its expertise and experience, has consistently concluded that
an English-only policy ... is likely in itself to 'create an atmosphere of inferiority,
isolation, and intimidation"') (citing 29 C.F.R. 1606.7 (2008)).
147. See id. at 1306 (finding that presumption of discrimination arises when
English-only rules are not grounded in some business purpose).
148. See id. at 1305 (characterizing issue as "whether a rational juror could
find on this record that the impact of the English-only policy on Hispanic workers
was 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [their] employment
and create an abusive working environment'") (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
149. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 ("When the workplace is permeated with 'dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment."') (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-
66 (1986)).
150. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1306 (deferring to EEOC guidelines). The
Maldonado court directed that the EEOC's experience and expertise warranted re-
spect and deference. The court "believe [d] that these conclusions are entitled to
respect, not as interpretations of governing law, but as an indication of what a
reasonable, informed person may think about the impact of an English-only work
rule on minority employees, even if we might not draw the same inference." Id.
Therefore, the court concluded that it would not be unreasonable for a juror to
find English-only rules discriminatory. See id. (stating that reasonable juror could
find that City's English-only rule created hostile and discriminatory work environ-
ment for Hispanic employees).
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court; the Tenth Circuit had thus created a circuit split.15 1 Currently, the
circuits disagree over both the proper amount of deference to accord the
EEOC guidelines and whether English-only rules create an inference of
discrimination, 152
IV. MAKING A CASE FOR DEFERENCE
The courts should give the EEOC guidelines "great deference"; how-
ever, the majority of courts considering challenges to English-only rules
have not deferred to the EEOC guidelines.' 53 Since 1984, Chevron, U.S.A,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.' 54 and its progeny have dic-
tated how much deference should be granted to a governmental agency's
statutory interpretation. 155 Nevertheless, courts have resisted deferring to
the EEOC guidelines, using three prominent arguments.1 56 First, courts
contend that national origin does not implicate primary language protec-
tion.15 7 Second, courts assert that Congress does not approve of the
151. See id. (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
City on disparate impact and treatment claims, intentional discrimination claim
and denial of equal protection claim); see also Prescott, supra note 94, at 449 (not-
ing that Maldonado created circuit split, thereby increasing likelihood that Su-
preme Court grant certiorari to future English-only cases).
152. See Prescott, supra note 94, at 449 (reporting that three of four circuits to
have considered English-only rules have held that English-only rules alone will not
satisfy Title VII claims).
153. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (explaining
that the EEOC guidelines "do constitute '(t) he administrative interpretation of the
Act by the enforcing agency,' and consequently they are 'entitled to great defer-
ence"') (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-434 (1971)); Espi-
noza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (refusing to defer to EEOC
guidelines because EEOC has flip-flopped on definition of "national origin"); see
also Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) (recognizing that
enforcing agency's interpretation may be entitled to special deference if its inter-
pretation is consistent and does not conflict with statutory language); Leonard,
supra note 9, at 110-11 (discussing Albemarle's argument for judicial deference to
EEOC guidelines).
154. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
155. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards,
Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807 (2002) (explaining Chevron
deference and historical implications of Chevron holding upon agency statutory
interpretation).
156. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984) (calling for deference to agency statutory interpretations); Griggs,
401 U.S. at 433-34 (declaring agency interpretation entitled to "great deference");
Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 94 (following Griggs to accord agency interpretation "great
deference"); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431 (according EEOC guidelines "great defer-
ence"); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (implying that EEOC
guidelines are entitled to some weight, even though it may be less weight than
other rulemaking agencies); Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th Cir.
1987) (following Albemarle and according EEOC guidelines "great deference").
157. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993)
(agreeing with Gloor's finding that language is preference, not immutable charac-
teristic like national origin); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980)
(advising that national origin should "not be confused with ethnic of sociocultural
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EEOC guidelines. 158 Third, courts maintain that the guidelines improp-
erly alter the Griggs burden-shifting analysis. 159 Although one scholar as-
serts that none of these reasons provide sufficientjustification for refusing
to defer to the EEOC guidelines, courts nevertheless continue to reject the
EEOC's approach to English-only rules.160
A. Proper Level of Deference: Chevron and Its Progeny
In Chevron, the Supreme Court firmly asserted that courts are not the
sole interpreters of the law. 16 1 The Chevron Court explained that adminis-
trative agencies may interpret the law and that these interpretations are
entitled to judicial deference.162 Further, Chevron required judicial defer-
ence to agency interpretations only if the agency had rulemaking author-
traits" like language (citing Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 94)); Kania v. Archdiocese of
Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (following Gloor and Spun Steak by
holding that language restrictions do not have disparate impact on national
origin).
158. Compare Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490 (stressing that Congress intended
plaintiffs to prove discrimination before burden of proof shifts and intimating that
English-only rules are insufficient proof of discrimination); Long v. First Union
Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 940 (E.D.Va. 1995) (agreeing with Spun Steak's assertion
that EEOC guidelines do not comport with Congress's intent); Kania, 14 F. Supp.
2d at 735 (noting Long argument that EEOC guideline's burden-shifting formula
appeared to contradict congressionally enacted framework in Title VII), with 29
C.F.R. 1606.7 (2008) (asserting that English-only rules are per se discriminatory
when blanketly enforced or when rules are not supported by business necessity).
159. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484, 1489 (noting Griggs analysis applies, but
refusing to apply EEOC guidelines because English-only rules alone are insuffi-
cient evidence to satisfy plaintiffs initial burden) Long, 894 F. Supp. at 940 (hold-
ing plaintiffs cannot satisfy first step of Griggs analysis solely based on existence of
English-only rule as the EEOC guidelines indicate); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.,
813 F.2d 1406, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (refusing to follow EEOC guideline and
allow English-only rule to establish employer's intent to discriminate). See also
Prescott, supra note 94, at 454-56 (asserting "national origin" does not include pro-
tection for primary language preferences); David T. Wiley, Whose Proof?.: Deference to
EEOC Guidelines on Disparate Impact Discrimination Analysis of "English-Only" Rules, 29
GA. L. REv. 539, 574-77 (1995) (emphasizing Congress did not intend "national
origin" to implicate language protections and guidelines conflict with congres-
sional intent); Cameron, supra note 9, at 301, (stating Congress did not intend to
protect primary language preferences with national origin and therefore guide-
lines conflict with congressionally adopted Griggs' burden-shifting analysis).
160. See Behm, supra note 95, at 592-94 (dispelling traditional arguments for
rejecting EEOC guidelines).
161. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 (directing courts to apply reasonable
agency statutory interpretations before conducting their own judicial interpreta-
tion); see also Lynch, supra note 7, at 92 (urging courts to recognize that Chevron
deference allows administrative agencies to issue interpretations) (citing Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843).
162. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 838; see also Lynch, supra note 7, at 92 (explaining
that agency's daily, on-going working relationship with Title VII should entitle
agency to "first crack" at interpretation).
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ity, Congress had not specifically addressed the issue and the agency's
interpretation was reasonable. 16-1
As several courts noted, the EEOC guidelines are not entitled to Chev-
ron's level of deference because Congress did not grant the EEOC
rulemaking authority.1 64 Nevertheless, as the administrative body charged
with interpreting, administering and enforcing Title VII, the EEOC and its
guidelines are entitled to "great deference." 65 Several courts have em-
163. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 (explaining agency interpretations de-
serve deference).
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the ques-
tion whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at is-
sue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be neces-
sary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the stat-
ute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id. at 84243
The court further notes that "[t] he judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are con-
trary to clear congressional intent." Id. at 843 n.9.
164. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Boochever, J., dissenting) ("EEOC regulations are entitled to somewhat less
weight than those promulgated by an agency with Congressionally delegated
rulemaking authority.") (citations omitted); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 141 (1976) ("[I]t should first be noted that Congress, in enacting Title
VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations
pursuant to that Title.") (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431
(1975)). For further discussion of why the EEOC did not receive rulemaking au-
thority, see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
165. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1975) ("The admin-
istrative interpretation of the [1965 Civil Rights] Act by the enforcing agency is
entitled to great deference."); see also Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431 (recounting Criggs'
deference and adopting that court's deferential approach); Gilardi v. Schroeder,
833 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th Cir. 1987) (deferring, like Griggs court, to agency's inter-
pretation); EEOC v. Start Products, Inc. 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(following Albemarle's declaration that EEOC guidelines are entitled to "great def-
erence"). But see Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (agreeing that
EEOC's interpretation is entitled to "great deference," but noting that there are
limits to that deference). The Espinoza Court noted that:
The Commission's more recent interpretation of the statute in the guide-
line relied on by the District Court is no doubt entitled to great defer-
ence, but that deference must have limits where, as here, application of
the guideline would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent
not to reach the employment practice in question. Courts need not defer
to an administrative construction of a statute where there are "compel-
ling indications that it is wrong."
Id. (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)); see also Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192-93 (1969) (explaining that agency interpretation should
carry great weight except in instances where agency interpretation runs contrary to
congressional intent); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261,
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phasized that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII ought to guide judi-
cial analysis because the guidelines "constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment."'16 6 The difference between Chevron deference and
the deference courts should accord to the EEOC guidelines is measured
by the weight of authority.' 67 Undoubtedly, the EEOC guidelines carry
less weight than an agency with rulemaking authority, but this does not
free courts to completely side-step the EEOC guidelines.1 68 Rather, the
EEOC guidelines are entitled to some judicial deference.' 69
272 (1968) (stating that agency interpretations of statutes deserve deference but
qualifying that "courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction,
and 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp"' administrative interpreta-
tions that courts deem inconsistent with congressional intent) (quoting NLRB v.
Brown 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965)).
166. E.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (explaining that
an agency experience with particular acts continues to warrant substantial defer-
ence to agency's interpretations, even where agency does not have advisory pow-
ers); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) ("[A]s an
'administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency, these Guidelines
... constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance.' ") (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) and Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 141-42); Spun Steak, 998 F.2d.
at 1489 (explaining court did not lightly reject EEOC guidelines because guide-
lines constitute body of experience). But see Leonard, supra note 9, at 110-11 (ar-
guing for Skidmore deference to EEOC guidelines). One commentator argues that
the EEOC guidelines are not entitled to the same amount of deference as rulemak-
ing agencies. See id. at 110-12 (explaining that EEOC was granted only power to
make procedural rules and not true rulemaking authority). Nevertheless, that
commentator concedes that an agency's interpretation is entitled to a certain
amount of deference based on its "experience and expertise." See id. at 110 (di-
recting courts to consider the "'thoroughness evident in [the agency's] considera-
tion, the validity of its reasoning, and its consistency"') (citations omitted).
Ultimately, the commentator concludes that the EEOC guidelines are not entitled
to "great deference" on account of the agency's experience with Title VII because
the EEOC guidelines are in clear conflict with congressional intent. See id. at 111-
12. (advocating Judge O'Scannlain's approach, from Spun Steak, that EEOC guide-
lines appear to be in direct conflict with congressional intent in enacting Title
VII).
167. Cf Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (holding that deference should be
granted to agency interpretations if agency has rulemaking authority); see also Gen.
Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 142 (recommending manner for determining weight given to
agency interpretation and implying that each factor will contribute to agency's per-
suasive power). In General Electric, the Court noted that "[t]he weight [given] ...
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements." Id.; see
also Synchro-Start, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14 (implying that EEOC guidelines are not
entitled to same deference as rulemaking authorities).
168. See Wiley, supra note 159, at 570 (arguing that case precedent clearly
establishes that guidelines promulgated by agencies without rule making authority
do not deserve same deference as administrative regulations); see also Leonard,
supra note 9, at 110 (recognizing that because EEOC does not have rulemaking
authority, its guidelines carry less weight).
169. See Behm, supra note 95, at 589 ("The most viable means of resolving this
conflict is through judicial deference to the EEOC guidelines."); Lynch, supra note
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B. Ancestral Ties Between Language and National Origin
Some courts assert-perhaps mistakenly-that the EEOC guidelines
are contrary to Congress's definition of the term "national origin."170 Al-
though Title VII does not expressly provide language protection within
the definition of national origin, that term arguably prohibits the use of
language as a form of national origin discrimination. 17 1 Overall, Congress
has provided little insight into the definition of national origin as it applies
to Title VII.
1 7 2
Critics of the EEOC guidelines argue that Congress did not intend to
give national origin a broad reading and that national origin refers solely
to ancestry.' 73 It is important to consider, however, that Congress drafted
Title VII during a time when the United States was predominately a "black
and white society. ' 174 As such, the court should not limit statutory inter-
7, at 91-97 (arguing that courts should give EEOC's interpretation of Title VII
substantial deference).
170. For a discussion of how courts incorrectly assert that the EEOC guide-
lines are contrary to Congress's definition of national origin, see infra notes 171-72
and accompanying text.
171. Cf Behm, supra note 95, at 589-90 (arguing that language is immutable
characteristic); cf also Prescott, supra note 94, at 446, 456-57 (asserting that Title
VII does not provide right to speak one's preferred language at work and that
plain meaning of Title VII does not grant language protection).
172. See Locke, supra note 9, at 50 ("Congress has offered remarkably little aid
in defining the term [national origin]."); Leonard, supra note 9, at 101 (noting
that language is not mentioned and there is no evidence that Congress even con-
sidered likelihood of language discrimination when they drafted Title VII).
173. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 9, at 300-01 (describing legislative history
of national origin definition). When Congress drafted Title VII, they initially in-
cluded "ancestry" within Title VII. See id. at 300 (explaining that when Congress
deleted "ancestry" from Title VII it did not view change as material, and noting
that that fact suggests that Congress saw "national origin" and "ancestry" as synony-
mous). Congress ultimately concluded that including both "national origin" and
"ancestry" within Title VII was redundant. See id. (same) (citing 110 CONG. REC.
2549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Roosevelt) (defining national origin during con-
gressional debate). Senator Roosevelt's comment is one of the only insights into
Congress' perceived definition of national origin. Cf Cameron, supra note 9, at
300-01 (recounting historical background of "national origin"). During a floor
debate, Senator Roosevelt described national origin to mean "the country from
which you or your forebears came .... You may come from Poland, Czechoslova-
kia, England, France, or any other country." Id. at 300 (citing 110 CONG. REc.
2549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Roosevelt)); see also Leonard, supra note 9, at 101-
02 (giving account of how Congress deleted "ancestry" from Title VII and Senator
Roosevelt's comments); Prescott, supra note 94, at 455 (explaining that legislative
history surrounding enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1964 indicates that national
origin was meant to be narrowly defined).
174. See Leonard, supra note 9, at 102 (recounting historical backdrop of
United States at time of drafting); see also Wiley, supra note 159, at 574-77 (recog-
nizing that Congress did not intend for definition of national origin to extend to
language protection). One scholar notes that at the time Congress drafted Title
VII, Congress was focused on eradicating racial problems between blacks and
whites. See Leonard, supra note 9, at 102 (explaining that Congress's "prime moti-
vation" for forbidding employment discrimination was to protect African-Ameri-
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pretation to its historical context. 175 Sometimes, necessity demands that
statutory interpretations extend to matters unanticipated by Congress.' 76
Nevertheless, such interpretations are not per se contrary to Congress's
intent, and should not necessarily be disregarded. 17 7 Likewise, even
though Congress may not have anticipated how the next immigration
cans). At the time, Congress had not lifted the immigration quotas. See id. at 102-
03 (recalling that Congress had not yet lifted immigration quotas and using that
fact to help explain that Congress was concerned about African-Americans but was
not yet concerned about Latin American immigrants). These quotas kept out
many Latin American immigrants who have been the main proponents of inter-
preting language discrimination as part of national origin. See id. (clarifying that
language did not move to forefront of employment discrimination until Latin
American immigration occurred because African-Americans' primary language
was usually English).
175. Cf Leonard, supra note 9, at 104 (stating that legislation periodically
"reaches situations that its framers never contemplated"). One commentator uses
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. as an example of legislation reaching situa-
tions unanticipated by its drafters. See id. at 104 (same) (citing Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)). In Oncale, the Supreme Court
considered whether Title VII's definition of sexual harassment should extend to
cases involving male-on-male harassment. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75 (finding that
"sex" discrimination does not protect only women or harassment from opposite
sex). The Court noted that Congress likely did not anticipate that its legislation
would extend to same-sex claims, but the court nevertheless permitted the instant
action to stand. See Leonard, supra note 9, at 104-05 (narrating facts surrounding
Oncale decision); see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (holding that Title VII protection
does not only extend to "'terms' and 'conditions' in the narrow contractual sense,
but 'evinces congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum'" of discrimina-
tion) (citations omitted). Likewise, although Congress may not have anticipated
that national origin discrimination claims would extend to language discrimina-
tion claims, courts should expand the definition of national origin with the chang-
ing American landscape. Cf Leonard, supra note 9, at 104 (conceding that
language may eventually fall under national origin because "statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils") (quoting
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79).
176. Cf Leonard, supra note 9, at 104 (maintaining that national origin may
be read broadly to include language protection).
177. See Locke, supra note 9, at 66 (concluding that Congressional failure to
adopt or reject EEOC guidelines is not dispositive but cannot be viewed as sign of
approval). One scholar argues that Congressional inaction mostly likely means
that Congress does not believe that national origin implicates language protection.
See id. ("Such inaction can hardly be read as affirmance of the EEOC policy.").
That scholar highlights that when Congress wanted to protect language rights, it
would historically take affirmative steps to do so. See id. at 66-67 (highlighting his-
torical examples of Congress taking action to protect particular rights and empha-
sizing Congress's inaction with respect to language rights). One example of such
action is legislation that mandates the issuance of voting ballots in various lan-
guages. See id. at 47, 66-67 (using Voting Rights Act as example of affirmative con-
gressional acts done to protect language rights). Ultimately, the scholar concludes
that Congress could not have anticipated that litigants would attempt to extend
national origin to implicate language protections and that as such, consulting con-
gressional history does not resolve the issue. See id. at 66 ("[A]t the time of the
Civil Rights Act was passed, Congress [had not] even contemplated the unprece-
dented future controversies resulting from employers' language conflicts with
their employees.").
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wave would subsequently result in the rise of language discrimination
cases, national origin should not necessarily be rigidly interpreted.
17 8
Scholars and courts alike recognize that a person's primary language
is inextricably tied to their national origin.179 Some commentators even
argue that language is an immutable characteristic like race, religion or
national origin.' 80 The fact that Congress has yet to formally adopt or
reject this interpretation of national origin is inconclusive.' 8 1 Congress's
inaction may be viewed as implied approval of the EEOC's consistent pol-
icy of interpreting national origin as providing primary language protec-
tion.1 82 Therefore, courts have wrongly rejected the EEOC guidelines,
178. See id. (explaining that Congress had not anticipated language problems
based on demographics and immigration statistics at time of drafting); see also Leo-
nard, supra note 9, at 102-03 (noting lack of evidence in legislative history to Civil
Rights Act evincing that Congress was concerned with language discrimination).
179. See Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of Se. Jud. Dist., 848 F.2d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir.
1988) ("[P]rimary language remains an important link to ... ethnic culture and
identity."); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging "im-
portance of a person's language preference or other aspects of his national, ethnic
or racial self-identification"); Locke, supra note 9, at 50 (noting that many scholars
agree that language ought to be included and thus protected under "penumbra of
national origin discrimination"); JosHuA A. FISHMA N, Language and Ethnicity, LAN-
GUAGE, ETHNICITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 15, 25 (Howard Giles ed., Academic
Press 1977) (describing nationality as encompassing cultural expression and not-
ing that such cultural expression includes language); Wiley, supra note 159, at 546
(noting that "most courts" associate "person's primary language with national
origin").
180. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Pri-
mary Language in the Workplace, 23 U. Mic-. J.L. REFORM 265, 274 (1990) (arguing
that primary language is "practically immutable" characteristic); Beth H. Storper,
Comment, English-Only Policies in the Workplace as Title VII National Origin Discrimina-
tion: Garcia v. Spun Steak, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 603, 605 (1994) ("[There is an]
immutable and unmistakable link between an individual's language and their cul-
tural or ethnic heritage .... ); cf also Prescott, supra note 94, at 454 (arguing that
language, unlike skin color, place of birth or sex, "can be obtained, improved, and
changed, which demonstrates that [language] is not an 'immutable' characteristic
aimed to be protected by Title VII").
181. Cf Leonard, supra note 9, at 104-07 (noting that Supreme Court has
avoided defining national origin in Alexander v. Sandoval). In Alexander, the Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to resolve the judicial debate surrounding the
definition of national origin as it pertained to Title VII. See 532 U.S. 275, 279, 293
(2001) (holding that plaintiffs did not have private cause of action thereby avoid-
ing defining "national origin"). Instead, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not
have such a claim. See id. at 293 (same). The Court has alternately avoided ruling
on the validity of English-only rules by denying cert to prior cases. See generally
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert denied 512 U.S. 1228
(1994) (dealing with discrimination challenge to English-only rule). Likewise,
Congress may be avoiding the task of defining national origin. Cf Leonard, supra
note 9, at 104-07 (highlighting fact that connection between language and na-
tional origin has not played decisive role in resolution of Title VII challenges to
English-only rules). For further discussion of why Congressional inaction is incon-
clusive, see supra note 177 and accompanying text.
182. See Locke, supra note 9, at 51 (noting that "the EEOC's prohibition
against English-only rules received congressional support during the discussions
regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1991"). Cf General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
2008] 627NOTE
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because including language within the definition of national origin is not
contrary to Congress's intent or to Title VII.
1 8 3
C. Both in Step: EEOC Guidelines and Congressional Intent
A handful of courts have relied on Chevron-perhaps erroneously-to
reject the EEOC guidelines by claiming that the guidelines are "contrary
to clear congressional intent."1 8 4 In light of Congress's silence, however,
the EEOC guidelines do not diverge from Congress's intent.'8 5 Congress
did not address language discrimination, because it could not have antici-
pated that language would become an issue. 18 6 Therefore, the EEOC-
acting in its capacity as the designated enforcing agency-promulgated
the EEOC guidelines in accordance with Chevron.187 Moreover, Con-
gress's purpose for enacting Title VII was "to assure the equality of oppor-
125, 141 (1976) (explaining that EEOC guidelines are not entitled to deference
when guidelines espouse policy inconsistent with prior agency interpretation);
Cameron, supra note 9, at 304 (highlighting Judge O'Scannlain's assertion in Gar-
cia that EEOC abandoned its longstanding position when it promulgated its
guidelines).
183. See Storper, supra note 180, at 604 (arguing that courts should follow
EEOC guidelines); cf. also Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding
that language is preference rather than characteristic of national origin) ;Jurado v.
Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that lan-
guage is not protected under Title VII); Behm, supra note 95, at 573 (emphasizing
that Congress never explicitly defined national origin); Prescott, supra note 94, at
454 (arguing that plain language and legislative history of Title VII prohibits courts
from including language protection within national origin protections); see also
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (finding that Congress
did not intend national origin to embrace citizenship).
184. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (rejecting EEOC guidelines); EEOC v.
Beauty Ent., Inc., No. 3:01CV378, 2005 WL 2764822, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 25,
2005) (declaring that EEOC guidelines are contrary to Title VII); Kania v. Archdio-
cese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (agreeing with Spun Steak's
rejection of EEOC guidelines); Prado v. L. Luria & Son, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1349,
1354 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (rejecting EEOC guidelines' presumption of invalidity of
blanket English-only rules).
185. Cf Lynch, supra note 7, at 93-95 (arguing that EEOC correctly chose to
promulgate guidelines because Title VII does not directly speak on matter of En-
glish-only rules and guidance was needed to clear up ambiguity); see also Chevron
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) (permitting agen-
cies to interpret statutes when Congress is silent on issue); Behm, supra note 95, at
573-75 (recognizing that EEOC-as enforcing agency of Title VII-acted within its
authority when it promulgated EEOC guidelines because Civil Rights Act of 1964
did not address English-only rules).
186. For a further discussion of why Congress did not address English-only
rules in Title VII, see supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
187. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 (allowing agencies to consider statutory
interpretation if Congress has not already clarified statute); see also Lynch, supra
note 7, at 92 (explaining that agencies may interpret statutes in absence of clear
congressional stance on issue). For a further discussion of agency authority to
interpret statues, see supra note 93 and accompanying text. Cf Spun Steak, 998
F.2d at 1489 (declaring EEOC acted outside scope of their authority); Kania, 14 F.
Supp. 2d at 735 (refusing to defer to EEOC guidelines because they "exceed the
authority of the statute they purport to interpret"); Prescott, supra note 94, at 450
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tunities by eliminating those practices and other devices that discriminate
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."18 8 Some ar-
gue that inasmuch as language and national origin are inextricably tied,
the EEOC undoubtedly crafted its guidelines in accordance with the pur-
pose of Title VII. 189 Therefore, courts should not characterize the EEOC
guidelines as incongruent with congressional intent.1 90
Additionally, Congress has approved of the EEOC guidelines. 191 In
the wake of several congressionally opposed court rulings, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act). 19 2 If Congress opposed the
(claiming EEOC "overstepped its authority" when agency promulgated EEOC
guidelines).
188. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457 (1975) (quot-
ing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)); see also Behm, supra
note 95, at 590 (indicating that EEOC guidelines were promulgated in accordance
with congressional purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
189. See Behm, supra note 95, at 590 (asserting that because language is fun-
damental aspect of national origin, EEOC guidelines are in accord with Title VII).
For a further discussion of how national origin implicates language protections,
see supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
190. See EEOC v. Synchron-Start Products, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913 (N.D.
Ill. 1999) (reiterating that "Congress ... charged EEOC with the interpretation,
administration and enforcement of Title VII"); Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of Se. Jud.
Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding EEOC guidelines to be con-
sistent with congressional intent and Title VII because guidelines seek to protect
persons being discriminated against based upon their national origin); Behm,
supra note 95, at 590-91 (stating that EEOC acted in accordance with Title VII's
purpose because guidelines aim at eliminating English-only rules enacted with in-
tent to discriminate); Lynch, supra note 7, at 92-97 (explaining why EEOC guide-
lines advance purpose of providing protection to special classes designated in Title
VII). Cf Leonard, supra note 9, at 112 (arguing that EEOC guidelines directly
conflict with Congress's approach to workplace equality under Title VII).
191. See Locke, supra note 9, at 51-53 (noting that EEOC guidelines received
support during congressional debate on Civil rights Act of 1991); see also EEOC v.
Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (high-
lighting exchange between Senators Deconcini and Kennedy and noting that both
Senators ultimately concluded 1991 Act would not affect application of EEOC
guidelines); Leonard, supra note 9, at 105-106 (recounting floor debate between
Senators).
192. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, supra note
43, at 896 & n.1 (citing five 1989 Supreme Court decisions that Congress found
inconsistent with Title VII); Leonard, supra note 9, at 107 (explaining that Con-
gress wrote 1991 Act in reaction to unfavorable court decisions); see also Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1989) (restricting Section 1981 to
conduct during contract formation, thus preventing Section 1981 from reaching
discriminatory working conditions); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S.
900, 905-06 (1989) (requiring plaintiffs to bring challenges to seniority systems
when system is adopted instead of when system causes plaintiff discriminatory
harm); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989) (allowing interested parties
that did not participate in creation of consent decrees to challenge those decrees);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989) (lessening business
necessity requirements and thereby decreasing plaintiff's ability to prevail in dispa-
rate impact cases); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (permit-
ting defendants to rebut Title VII discrimination claims by proving that defendant
would have made same business decision even absent any discriminatory motive).
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EEOC guidelines, they most likely would have amended the EEOC guide-
lines within the 1991 Act.193 Instead, Congress chose not mention or alter
the EEOC guidelines. 19 4 That silence may be viewed as a form of tacit
acceptance.' 9 5 Furthermore, an exchange between Senators DeConcini
and Kennedy revealed Congress's approval of the EEOC guidelines.
19 6
Notably, the Senators expressed concern about the 1991 Act altering the
EEOC guidelines; however, the two legislators ultimately determined that
the 1991 Act would not vary the guidelines' application. 197 That concern
illustrates Congress's approval of the EEOC guidelines. 19 8 In conclusion,
the EEOC guidelines invariably reflect Congress's intent to protect minor-
193. See Premier, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 ("'An agency interpretation is enti-
tled to greater deference when Congress is aware of the interpretation and chooses
not to change it when amending the statute in other respects.'") (quoting United
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979)); Behm, supra note 95, at 591 (main-
taining that Congress implicitly approved of EEOC guidelines when they passed
1991 Act). The 1991 Act amended Title VII. See id. (recounting how Congress
discussed EEOC guidelines when drafting 1991 Amendment and chose not to alter
them). One scholar interprets the amendment by arguing "[c]ertainly, if Congress
had viewed the EEOC's guidelines ... as an incorrect interpretation of Title VII, it
would have called for their alteration." Id. That scholar argues that accordingly,
Congress implicitly found the EEOC guidelines to comport with the congressional
intent embodied in Title VII. See id. (emphasizing Congressional choice not to
alter EEOC guidelines when opportunity presented itself).
194. See Behm, supra note 95, at 591 (same); cf also Leonard, supra note 9, at
106-107 (arguing that Congressional failure to adopt EEOC guidelines when Con-
gress was already engaged in adopting another branch's interpretation of Title VII
indicates Congress did not approve of EEOC guidelines' interpretation of Title
VII). For further discussion of how Congress's silence may be viewed as tacit ap-
proval, see supra note 177 and accompanying text.
195. See Behm, supra note 95, at 591 (contending that if Congress had dis-
agreed with EEOC guidelines, Congress would have taken advantage of opportu-
nity to change guidelines).
196. See Locke, supra note 9, at 51-53 (quoting exchange between Senators).
Mr. DeConcini: Many of my constituents have brought to my attention an increas-
ing problem with nonjob related discipline and termination of people for speaking
languages other than English in the workplace. Is the Senator aware of the EEOC
regulations dealing with this problem.
Mr. Kennedy: Yes, the EEOC promulgated such regulations in 1980.
Mr. DeConcini: These regulations reflect the fact that the primary language of an
individual is often an essential national origin characteristic. Does the Senator
agree that these regulations found in 29 CFR 16067.7 [sic] provide a sound and
effective method for dealing with this problem?
Mr. Kennedy: Yes, I agree that this regulation has worked well during the past 11
years it has been in effect.
Mr. DeConcini: Therefore, ifS. 1745 [1991 Amendment] is passed and signed into
law by the President, the EEOC regulations would be consistent with [T]itle VII as
amended by S. 1745.
Id. (same); cf also Leonard, supra note 9, at 106-07 (asserting statements between
senators are not indicative of legislative intent or will).
197. See Locke, supra note 9, at 51-53 (providing verbatim exchange between
Senators DeConcini and Kennedy).
198. For further discussion of whether Congress approved of EEOC guide-
lines when enacting 1991 Act, see supra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53: p. 595
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss3/5
ity groups from discrimination; that intent led to the enactment of both
the 1964 and the 1991 Civil Rights Acts.1 99 Accordingly, courts ought to
defer to the EEOC guidelines.
2 0 0
D. Spun Steak's Criticism: The Court's Biggest Attack on the
EEOC Guidelines
In Spun Steak, the Ninth Circuit criticized the EEOC guidelines for
altering the Griggs burden-shifting analysis. 20 1 Noting that Congress codi-
fied that analysis in the 1991 Act, the Spun Steak court contended that the
199. See EEOC v. Synchron-Start Products, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 914-15
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (concluding that EEOC guidelines comport with Congress's in-
tent); Lynch, supra note 7, at 92-93 (maintaining that Congress's awareness entitles
EEOC guidelines to deference); Behm, supra note 95, at 589-91 (contending that
EEOC guidelines comport with purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that Con-
gress validated that assertion by not altering EEOC guidelines in 1991 Act); cf also
Leonard, supra note 9, at 106-07 (questioning whether congressional debate dur-
ing 1991 Act amounts to approval or disapproval of EEOC guidelines); Locke,
supra note 9, at 51-67 (discussing Congressional inaction regarding EEOC guide-
lines and considering whether such inaction should be interpreted as silent ap-
proval or sign of disapproval); Prescott, supra note 94, at 461 (characterizing
Congressional inaction towards EEOC guidelines as sign that most courts have cor-
rectly chosen to side-step or ignore EEOC guidelines).
200. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45
(1984) (advocating deference to agency interpretations promulgated in absence of
congressional action). In Chevron, the Court stated that agencies receive an ex-
press delegation of authority to interpret statutes when Congress has deliberately
left a gap. See id. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency .. "). Reasoning that
the agency could draw upon its experience, the Chevron Court permitted agencies
to adopt reasonable policies. See id. (cautioning that interpretations that appear
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute" will likely be over-
turned). The Court in Chevron directed lower courts to defer to the agency's inter-
pretation so long as the interpretation represents "a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute" or that
its interpretation is not one that runs contrary to legislative history or Congres-
sional intent. See id. at 844-45 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383
(1961)).
201. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
EEOC guidelines). The Spun Steak court asserted that it would "not defer to 'an
administrative construction of a statute where there are compelling indications
that it is wrong."' Id. (citations omitted). The court maintained that the EEOC
guidelines were "wrong" because the guidelines altered Title VII's burden-shifting
analysis. See id. (arguing that existence of English-only rule should not permit em-
ployees to meet initial prima facie burden). In particular, the court in Spun Steak
held that English-only rules do not always create hostile work environments; how-
ever, the EEOC guidelines presume that all English-only rules discriminate against
non-English-speakers and require businesses to provide business justification for
enacting such rules. See id. (contending that workplace dynamics are complex and
therefore one factor-such as whether employer instated English-only rule-
should not be dispositive evidence of discrimination). Based on its position of
requiring all businesses to advance business justifications for enacting English-only
rules, the Spun Steak court rejected the EEOC guidelines as contrary to Title VII.
See id. (finding that "nothing in the plain language" of statute supports EEOC
guideline's stance on English-only rules).
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EEOC guidelines ran contrary to congressional intent and were therefore
not entitled to deference. 20 2 In particular, the court faulted the EEOC
guidelines for automatically shifting the burden of proof merely because
defendant employers instated an English-only rule. 20 3 The Spun Steak
court did not consider the existence of an English-only rule as sufficient
evidence of discrimination to allow plaintiff employees to forego satisfying
their initial burden of proof.2 0 4 Today, numerous courts use Spun Steak's
rejection of the EEOC guidelines as a basis for dismissing English-only
claims; nevertheless, many regard that reliance as fundamentally
flawed.2 0
5
In Spun Speak, the Ninth Circuit concluded that English-only policies
do not inevitably lead to an abusive work environment. 20 6 In contrast, the
202. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486-89 (laying out burden-shifting analysis
presented in Griggs); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 (declaring that any agency
interpretation contrary to congressional or legislative intent does not deserve def-
erence); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (determining that
courts need not defer to agency interpretations that are clearly "wrong").
203. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (criticizing EEOC guidelines for dispos-
ing of plaintiff's initial burden of proof).
204. See id. (criticizing EEOC guidelines for disposing of plaintiff's initial bur-
den of proof).
205. See Synchron-Start, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (emphasizing that EEOC guide-
lines correctly create inference of discrimination); Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of Se.Jud.
Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1988) (agreeing that English-only rules ad-
versely impact non-English-speaking employees); Lynch, supra note 7, at 66-68
(maintaining that nature of English-only rules is discriminatory). Although Spun
Steak's arguments are among the most often cited justifications for upholding En-
glish-only rules, courts should not have relied on Spun Steak. Cf Guitierrez, 838 F.2d
1031, 1043-46 (holding that English-only rules discriminate against bilingual speak-
ers). Instead, courts ought to look to the Gutierrez court's analysis of English-only
rules. Cf. Cameron, supra note 9, at 303-04 (faulting Spun Steak for declining to
follow Gutierrez and for relying on Gloor). The Gutierrez court concluded that En-
glish-only rules adversely affect protected groups and should be subject to close
scrutiny. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040 (concluding that "English-only rules ...
have an adverse impact on protected groups and that they should be closely scruti-
nized"); see also Lynch, supra note 7, at 94-95 (agreeing with language in EEOC
guidelines that English-only rules create atmosphere of intimidation). Many be-
lieve that the Spun Steak court should have instead followed Gutierrez. See, e.g., Cam-
eron, supra note 9, at 303-04 (implying that Spun Steak court had obligation to
follow Gutierrez because Gutierrez was only vacated as moot). Because Gutierrez re-
signed from her job at the Los Angeles Municipal Court, the Supreme Court va-
cated the Gutierrez court decision as moot; accordingly, the Spun Steak court easily
dispensed with the Guitierrez precedent with a simple footnote. See id. at 303-04
(recounting history of Gutierrez case).
206. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (concluding that English-only rules do
not "inexorably lead to an abusive environment for those whose primary language
is not English"). But see 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2008) (concluding that English-
only rules "create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on
national origin"). Spun Steak's rejection of the EEOC guidelines and refusal to
follow Gutierrez is perhaps unsurprising. Cf Note, supra note 192, at 897
(prophesizing that "[t]he majority of courts ... will likely take advantage of the
ambiguity [contained in the 1991 Act] and follow their former doctrinal [ap-
proaches]"). Because the 1991 Act became "water[ed] down" as a result of con-
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EEOC guidelines characterize English-only rules as inherently discrimina-
tory. 207 Employers use English-only rules to discriminate against their em-
ployees in numerous ways.20° By enacting English-only rules, employers
prevent employees from effectively communicating, which is an essential
element of job performance. 20 9 Also, English-only rules may be used as a
means of denying promotion or may even be the basis for termination. 210
Moreover, English-only rules cause "dignitary harms" by making non-En-
glish speaking employees feel less American. 2 11 Invariably, English-only
gressional animus, courts remained free to employ their own approach to English-
only rules. See id. at 896 (noting two-year delay caused by political disagreements).
Therefore, the Spun Steak court's decision to ignore the Guitierrez court precedent
was perhaps predicable. Cf id. at 897 (emphasizing that result of bill becoming
"water[ed] down" was that it was ambiguous and that courts were "likely to take
advantage of the ambiguity and follow their former doctrinal [patterns]").
207. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2008) (declaring that English-only rules are "a
burdensome term and condition of employment... [t]herefore, the Commission
will presume that such a rule violates title VII and will closely scrutinize it"). The
EEOC guidelines are not a wholesale rejection of English-only rules. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7(b) (2008) (noting that some English-only rules are not inherently dis-
criminatory). For instance, the guidelines distinguish between blanket and tai-
lored English-only rules, noting that only blanket prohibitions are per se
discriminatory. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2008) (finding blanket English-
only rules to be inherently discriminatory), with 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (2008) (re-
quiring businesses to advance legitimate business necessity reasons for enacting
tailored English-only rules). Additionally, the EEOC guidelines do not assert that
English-only rules are always discriminatory. See Synchron-Start, 29 F. Supp. 2d at
914 (emphasizing that EEOC guidelines do not automatically place burden of per-
suasion on employer, the guidelines direct that English-only rules create an infer-
ence of discrimination). The guidelines merely assert that English-only rules
create an inference of discrimination, which may be rebutted with adequate busi-
ness necessity. See id. (same); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2008) (asserting that En-
glish-only rules "could result in a discriminatory working environment") (emphasis
added).
208. Cf Behm, supra note 95, at 592-603 (declaring that English-only rules
unquestionably constitute discrimination based on national origin).
209. See id. at 598-99 ("[E]ffective communication in the workplace is an es-
sential-and often necessary-element of acceptable job performance, especially
at the training level.").
210. See id. at 598 (citing job loss as most obvious harm produced by English-
only rules).
211. See id. at 599-600 (explaining how English-only rules cause employees to
suffer "dignitary harms"); see alsoJeffrey D. Kirtner, Note, English-Only Rules and the
Role of Perspective in Title VII Claims, 73 TEX. L. REv. 871, 896 (1995) ("The implicit
message to [employees whose primary language is not English] is that if they 'act
white' they can stay, but if not, they can and will be replaced."); Wendy Olson, The
Shame of Spanish: Cultural Bias in English First Legislation, 11 CHICANo-LATINO L. REv.
1, 24 (1991) (English-only rules inflict an injury "of stigmatization, or... one of
stamping non-English speakers with a 'badge of inferiority'") (citation omitted));
Anthony Stitt, English-only Rule: Safety Issue or Discrimination?, COURIER TIMES, March
20, 2000, available at http://www.englishfirst.org/workplace/workplaceestee-
lauder.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (quoting bilingual employees who felt "of-
fended" by Estee Lauder's implementation of English-only policy in their assembly
factory).
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rules are discriminatory in nature. 21 2 By merely proving that their em-
ployers enacted such policies, plaintiff employees can adequately make
out a prima facie case of discrimination.2 13 Therefore, the EEOC guide-
lines do not run afoul of congressional intent or the Griggs' burden-shift-
ing analysis.
214
Courts and scholars alike charge that Spun Steak wrongly concluded
that the EEOC guidelines alter the Griggs burden-shifting analysis.2 1 5 The
discriminatory nature of English-only rules creates an inference of discrim-
ination.21 6 Therefore, the guidelines do not conflict with congressional
intent and courts should not use Spun Steak as a basis for rejecting the
EEOC guidelines.
21 7
212. For discussion of whether English-only rules are inherently discrimina-
tory, see supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
213. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)-(b) (2008) (stating that blanket English-only
rules are presumed discriminatory but that tailored English-only rules may be re-
butted by business necessity showing); Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of Se. Jud. Dist., 838
F.2d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1988) (asserting that English-only rules "generally have
an adverse impact... [and] can readily mask an intent to discriminate on the basis
of national origin," and that as such, merely proving that employer has enacted
English-only rule is sufficient for initial burden of proof); Maldonado v. City of
Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1306 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that existence of English-
only rule may aid jury in determining whether employer acted with discriminatory
intentions). Cf Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (re-
jecting EEOC guidelines because they do not follow Griggs' analysis); Prescott,
supra note 94, at 452 (distinguishing Maldonado's holding from EEOC guidelines
and arguing that Maldonado court did not explicitly state that English-only rules
are discriminatory).
214. See EEOC v. Synchron-Start Products, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913-14
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (summarizing requirements for agency interpretation to receive
deference and concluding that EEOC guidelines merely create inference of dis-
crimination and that such an inference does not run afoul of legislative intent).
215. Cf EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074-75
(N.D. Tex. 2000) (disapproving of Spun Steak); Synchron-Start, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 913-
14 (finding fault with Spun Steak); see also Cameron, supra note 9, at 305 (rejecting
Spun Steak's approach).
216. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040 (agreeing with EEOC guidelines that En-
glish-only rules create discriminatory work environment); Lynch, supra note 7, at
92-93 (asserting that discriminatory nature of English-only rules is sufficient to sat-
isfy prima facie case of discrimination); Behm, supra note 95, at 573 (emphasizing
that Congress never expressly defined national origin or addressed English-only
rules).
217. See Locke, supra note 9, at 63 (arguing that Spun Steak applied wrong
standard of review to EEOC regulations). One scholar argued that the Ninth Cir-
cuit wrongly rejected the EEOC guidelines by applying a stringent standard of re-
view. See id. (faulting court for not using more deferential standard of review).
The Spun Steak court rejected the EEOC guidelines because it could not find clear
congressional or textual support within Title VII to support the guidelines; that
scholar nevertheless contends that "this standard is too high." See id. (maintaining
that EEOC guidelines were not inconsistent with congressional intent). Rather,
the scholar claims that the EEOC guidelines should only be rejected if the guide-
lines are "inconsistent with congressional intent." See id.; see also The Civil Rights Act
of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, supra note 43, at 896-902 (emphasizing that
Congressional changes to Title VII were plaintiff friendly); Lynch, supra note 7, at
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V. CONCLUSION
Judicial refusal to defer to the EEOC guidelines perpetuates national
origin discrimination. 218 Without proper deference to the EEOC guide-
lines, workplaces remain hostile environments for bilingual American and
immigrant workers. 2 19 Alarmingly, that lack of deference ignores over-
whelming research concerning code-switching. 2 20  Bilingual employees
94 (noting that EEOC guidelines comport with congressional intent because they
do not disrupt burden-shifting analysis). Congress's rationale for drafting the 1991
Act was to undo prior court holdings and mandate a more pro-plaintiff approach
to Title VII claims. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard,
supra note 43, at 897 (explaining Congressional motive behind 1991 Amendment).
Even though the final version of the 1991 Act was considered by some to be
"water[ed] down," Congress sufficiently accomplished its intent. See id. (noting
that 1991 Act "still contains a sufficiently clear statement of congressional intent"
to overrule Wards Cove). Likewise, the EEOC guidelines are pro-plaintiff and thus
arguably further Congressional intent. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039-40 & n.7
(describing EEOC guidelines' pro-plaintiff burden-shifting analysis and noting that
guidelines are entitled to deference so long as they comport with congressional
intent).
218. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040 (noting that few courts had addressed En-
glish-only rules, that such English-only rules often "mask" discrimination and that
courts should carefully scrutinize such rules to eradicate discrimination).
219. See 29 C.F.R. 1606.7(a) (2008) (declaring that English-only rules may
"create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation"); see also Premier,
113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (describing how English-only rules make employees feel
uncomfortable and intimidated); Toby Costas, Court Speaks: English-only Rule Unlaw-
ful; Awards EEOC $700, 000 for Hispanic Workers (Sept. 19, 2000), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/press/9-19-00.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (" [T]he policy served
to create a disruption in the workplace and feelings of alienation and inade-
quacy.") (quoting former employee of Premier Operator Services); Stitt, supra
note 211, at I (describing how English-only rule alienated bilingual employees).
Cf Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (re-
counting explanation that English-only rule aimed to alleviate workplace hostility);
Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., No. 95-1986, 1996 WL 281954, at *1 (4th Cir.
1996) (unpublished table decision) (explaining that English-only rule imple-
mented in response to customer and employee complaints); Gonzalez v. Salvation
Army, No. 89-1679-CIV-T-17, 1991 WL 11009376, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 1991)
(reporting that employer enacted English-only rule to alleviate workplace hostil-
ity), affd 985 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirmed without opinion); Eric Ma-
tusewitch, English-Only Rules Come Under Fire: Edict Forcing 'Workplace Necessity' Pass
Court Muster, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 30, 1998, at 7 (summarizing Father's argu-
ment in Kania that speaking other languages is "offensive and derisive" to those
who do not understand).
220. See Premier, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-71 (describing code-switching and
explaining why bilingual speakers are often incapable of restraining primary lan-
guage usage); Behm, supra note 95, at 596-97 (emphasizing that code-switching is
prevalent problem among bilinguals). At least one court has criticized the Spun
Steak court for its reliance on Gloor pointing out that the Gloor decision was made
prior to the publication of code switching research, which dispelled the long-held
belief that language usage is merely a preference. See Premier, 113 F. Supp. 2d at
1074 (noting that Cloor court handed down decision prior to publication of exten-
sive research on code-switching). Code-switching proves that many bilingual peo-
ple are not always capable of controlling their language usage. Compare Premier,
113 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (noting that Gloor court handed down decision prior to
publication of extensive research on code-switching), and Cameron, supra note 9,
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should not be punished for casual language usage or slips, because usage
is not entirely within their control. 22 1 Furthermore, English-only rules do
not remedy workplace hostility problems. 222 Instead, the rules create a
deeper divide between coworkers.
223
Moreover, by not deferring to the EEOC guidelines, courts leave bi-
lingual employees without proper recourse. 224 More often than not,
courts that refuse to defer to the EEOC guidelines effectively disregard
employee challenges to English-only rules, by finding that employees have
not met their initial prima facie showing of discrimination. 22 5 Many com-
at 305 (urging courts not to follow Gloor because that decision predated code-
switching research), and Behm, supra note 95, at 596 (arguing that Gloor's analysis
is flawed because that analysis did not consider problems presented by code-switch-
ing), with Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (claiming that English-
only rules do not discriminate against bilingual employees because bilingual em-
ployees can chose which language to speak), and Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d
1480, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993) (relying on Gloor and Jurado to characterize language
usage as "self expression" and "matter of preference") (citations omitted).
221. See generally Premier, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1066-71 (reporting Dr. Berk-Selig-
son's testimony). Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson testified in court as an expert witness;
her testimony directly attacked the long-held belief-originating from Gloor-that
bilingual employees have control over their language usage. See id. (recalling testi-
mony of expert witness). Dr. Berk-Seligman testified instead that many bilingual
people have difficulty with code-switching and are unable to control lapses into
their primary language. See id. (same); cf also Behm, supra note 95, at 596, 598-99
(arguing that English-only rules unfairly punish bilingual employees often result-
ing in fewer promotions or even termination).
222. See Behm, supra note 95, at 600 (finding that English-only rules contrib-
ute to workplace hostility); see also Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc.,
568 F.2d 87, 87-88 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that ethnic slurs about Italian-Ameri-
cans made by plaintiff's supervisor were part of casual conversation and were not
so excessive and disgraceful as to rise to level of Title VII violation); St. J. Enriquez
v. Transit Mixed Concrete Co., 492 F. Supp. 390, 393 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (concluding
that Mexican-American plaintiff failed to prove national origin discrimination
where plaintiff was harassed by coworkers but such harassment was never brought
to the attention of employer or supervisors); Morales v. Dain, Kalman and Quail,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1031, 1036, 1039 (D. Minn. 1979) (holding that Cuban plaintiff
was not harassed when supervisor made comments concerning "fast-thinking
Latin-Americans"); Fakete v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (explaining that isolated incidents of coworker harassment were
not based on plaintiffs Hungarian national origin because even if harassment was
based on plaintiffs national origin, employer would not have been liable where
employer took preventative measures and corrective steps with regard to those in-
cidents of which employer's administrative and supervisory personnel were aware);
EEOC Compl. Man. § 13-IV (2006) (listing several cases to illustrate extent of
workplace hostility).
223. For further discussion of workplace hostility, see supra note 222 and ac-
companying text.
224. Cf Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490 (Boochever, J., dissenting) (noting diffi-
culty of presenting prima facie case of discrimination if EEOC guidelines are not
accepted).
225. See, e.g., Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., No. 95-1986, 1996 WL 281954,
at *2 (4th Cir. May 29, 1996) (unpublished table decision) (concluding that plain-
tiff employees could not sustain prima facie case); Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90
(holding that bilingual employees did not make out prima facie discrimination
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mentators point to the EEOC's court backlog to argue that the EEOC
guidelines make initiating suits too easy for employees; nevertheless, the
backlog also illustrates how pervasive and widespread national origin dis-
crimination has become.
226
In response, some scholars call for Congressional action. 22 7 Drawing
on examples of successful prior actions, some scholars recommend that
Congress either explicitly support the EEOC guidelines or amend Title
VII. 228 In the meantime, employers can take remedial steps towards allevi-
ating the discriminatory effects of English-only rules.2 29 For example, em-
ployers can employ bilingual supervisors, conduct racial seminars and
distribute multilingual materials that describe workplace safety standards
and procedures; such actions are all viable alternatives to enacting En-
glish-only rules. 230 Indeed, for those employers who truly enact English-
only rules out of business necessity, a reasonable alternative exists.
231
case);Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting
that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to make out prima facie case); Kania
v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (deciding that
plaintiff failed to state prima facie case); Cf Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d
1294, 1303 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that English-only rule provided sufficient
evidence of discrimination to withstand summary judgment motion); Premier, 113
F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (finding that English-only rule constituted disparate treatment
of Hispanic employees); EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911,
914 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (declaring court persuaded by EEOC guidelines that English-
only rules are presumptively discriminatory).
226. See John 0. Cunningham, Commentary: "English-only" Complaints on the
Rise, LAwYis WEEKLY USA, Jan. 30, 2006 (noting that EEOC takes dim view of
English-only rules and that that view helps employees to obtain large settlements).
227. See Behm, supra note 95, at 604 (encouraging Congress to put some
"teeth" into EEOC guidelines); Locke, supra note 9, at 71-72 (calling on Congress
to amend Title VII).
228. See, e.g., Behm, supra note 95, at 604 (encouraging Congress to react in
similar manner as it did to General Electric). In General Electric, the Court held that
pregnant women were not a protected class defined within Title VII. See id. at 604
n.261 (holding that Title VII sex discrimination does not protect pregnant wo-
men). In response, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. See id. at
604 (describing Congressional displeasure towards and reaction to General Electric).
Behm argues that Congress should react similarly and add language protection to
Title VII. See id. (calling on Congress to put "teeth" into EEOC guidelines by
amending Title VII).
229. Cf EEOC Compl. Man. § 13-4V (suggesting alternatives to English-only
rules); Behm, supra note 95, at 608 (making suggestions for nondiscriminatory
alternatives to English-only rules).
230. See Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of S.E. Jud. Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir.
1988) (recommending bilingual supervisors); EEOC Compl. Man. § 13-V (ex-
plaining policies that employer can invoke in order to prevent liability). Accord
Behm, supra note 95, at 608 (suggesting racial tension seminars, bilingual supervi-
sors and multilingual emergency procedures); Cunningham, supra note 226 (sug-
gesting that employers use nonverbal emergency procedures); Alex Kotlowitz, Our
Town, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 5, 2007, at 34.
231. For a discussion of the employers who truly enact English-only rules out
of business necessity and the reasonable alternatives that exist, see supra note 230
and accompanying text.
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In conclusion, the EEOC guidelines properly address the problems
created by employers who enact English-only rules. 23 2 Although the
EEOC does not have rulemaking authority, the EEOC guidelines reflect
the agency's experience with national origin discrimination; therefore,
courts ought to accord the guidelines some judicial deference. 23 3 As the
American cultural landscape morphs, it is essential that employers remain
tolerant and refrain from discrimination. 2 34 The United States is, after all,
a nation predominately comprised of immigrants. 23 5
Robyn S. Stoter
232. See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1306 (10th Cir. 2006)
(determining that EEOC guidelines are helpful for determining discriminatory in-
tent); Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040 (adopting EEOC guidelines); EEOC v. Premier
Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (deferring to
EEOC guidelines); EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 914
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (accepting EEOC guidelines). Accord Behm, supra note 95, at 590-
604 (arguing for deference to EEOC guidelines); Lynch, supra note 7, at 92-94
(defending EEOC guidelines as consistent with congressional intent); Locke, supra
note 9, at 51-68 (calling for legislative action against English-only rules).
233. For a discussion of how the EEOC guidelines reflect the agency's experi-
ence with national origin discrimination and how courts ought to accord the
guidelines some level ofjudicial deference, see supra notes 153-217 and accompany-
ing text.
234. For a discussion of the changing American cultural response to immigra-
tion waves, see supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
235. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 67 ("It is ironic that a nation established by
immigrants would restrict the practices of other similarly situated, but temporarily
disadvantaged immigrants.").
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